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This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0) (2000). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issues presented by this appeal are whether the trial court properly 
dismissed Appellants' claims against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
("State Farm") on the grounds that (1) an insurer may limit or deny PIP benefits to an 
insured based upon the results of a medical examination by a physician retained by the 
insurer; and (2) Appellants' claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year statute 
of limitations governing insurance contracts. The trial court considered the terms of the 
insurance policy under which the Appellants were insured at the time of the accident. 
The trial court also considered the admissions of Appellants' counsel at argument. 
Because these matters were presented to and considered by the trial court, the court 
exercised its discretion to treat State Farm's motion to dismiss as one for summary 
judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court should review 
the trial court's ruling for correctness, and "may affirm a summary judgment on any 
ground available to the trial court, even if not relied on below." Straub v. Fisher & 
Pavkel Health Care, 1999 UT 102, t P6, 990 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1999). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issue presented in this 
appeal: 
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Utah No Fault Statute: 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary 
medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including 
prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, 
not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Limitation of Actions Under Insurance Contract: 
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first-party 
insurance must be commenced within three years after the 
inception of the loss. 
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to 
the complainant will arise from a delay in bringing suit 
against an insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay 
itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on an 
insurance policy to compel payment under the policy until the 
earlier of: 
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as 
required under the policy; 
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or 
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment. 
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in 
which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration 
procedure prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as 
agreed to by the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1999). 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses 
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . [and] (6) failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . . If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 
56. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 12(b) (2001). 
Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. 
Complete texts of these statutes and rules are provided in the Addendum hereto. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts 
State Farm set forth each ofthe following undisputed facts in the memorandum in 
support of its motion to dismiss. (R. 127-130) These facts appear in Appellants' 
Amended Complaint or in the policy pursuant to which Appellants are insured.1 
On August 5, 1994, Appellants were involved in an automobile accident with 
defendant Maye Helen Potter at the intersection of 3500 South 3600 West, West Valley 
City, Utah. (R. 127) Appellants have alleged significant and permanent injuries resulting 
from this accident. (R. 127) Following the August 5, 1994 accident, Appellants' doctors 
performed various tests and treatments to alleviate their alleged injuries, causing 
Appellants to incur medical expenses. (R. 127) 
At the time ofthe accident, Appellants were insured under State Farm Automobile 
Insurance Policy No. 7477527-A29-44, policy form 9844.3, with endorsements 6082P, 
6093R, and 6885EE.1 (hereinafter the "Policy"). (R. 128, 145) The inception date ofthe 
Appellants' Policy was July 29, 1994. (R. 128, 145) The Policy provides that State Farm 
1
 State Farm filed a motion to dismiss Appellants' claims against State Farm on October 
23, 2000. (R. 122) State Farm submitted a memorandum in support of this motion, 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 ofthe Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. (R. 125) 
Appellants did not respond to State Farm's motion to dismiss. Instead, Appellants filed a 
motion to strike State Farm's motion to dismiss, and a motion for partial summary 
judgment. (R. 239, 250) Neither of Appellants' motions set forth a statement of facts, 
nor did Appellants contest any ofthe facts recited by State Farm. Accordingly, under 
Rule 4-501(2)(B) ofthe Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, those facts set forth in 
State Farm's motion to dismiss (which later was converted by the district court to a 
motion for summary judgment) are deemed admitted. 
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shall provide personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits to Appellants, including the 
reasonable value of all necessary medical expenses incurred by Appellants up to 
$3000.00 per person. (R. 128, 153) The Policy also provides that an insured who makes 
a claim against the policy shall "be examined by physicians chosen and paid by [State 
Farm] as often as [State Farm] reasonably may require." (R. 128, 149) 
Appellants did not claim any PIP benefits from August 5, 1994—the date of the 
accident—until August 1996, when Appellants sent their medical bills to State Farm for 
reimbursement. In September 1996, State Farm requested that Appellants undergo a 
medical examination by Dr. Stephen Marble, a physician retained by State Farm, to 
determine whether Appellants' medical expenses were reasonable, necessary, and related 
to the August 5, 1994 accident for which Appellants seek coverage. (R. 128) After 
examining Marian Tucker, Dr. Marble concluded, in a report dated October 22, 1996, that 
Mrs. Tucker's injuries were not related to the August 5, 1994 automobile accident, and 
that her injuries arose out of a pre-existing condition. (R. 128) After examining Dee Voy 
Tucker, Dr. Marble concluded, in a report dated October 22, 1996, that Dee Voy 
Tucker's injuries arose out of the August 5, 1994 automobile accident. (R. 128-29) With 
respect to Mr. Tucker's medical expenses, Dr. Marble stated that one set of x-rays was 
duplicative and therefore unnecessary. (R. 129) 
Based upon Dr. Marble's conclusions, State Farm paid all reasonable and 
necessary medical expenses related to the Appellants' automobile accident in November 
1996. (R. 129, 701). State Farm declined to pay all of Appellants' claimed medical 
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expenses. At the hearing on State Farm's motion to dismiss, counsel for Appellants 
conceded that Appellants first learned of State Farm's refusal to pay all of their claimed 
medical expenses in November 1996, nearly four years before Appellants filed suit 
against State Farm. (R. 700-01) 
B, Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court 
Below 
This case involves Appellant's challenge to the trial court's dismissal of 
Appellants' claims against State Farm. 
On July 27, 1998, Appellants filed a personal injury suit against Maye Helen 
Potter. (R. 1, 129) On September 12, 2000, Appellants amended their complaint to 
include State Farm as a defendant. (R. 16, 129) In their Amended Complaint, Appellants 
allege that State Farm failed to meet its obligations to Appellants under the Policy. (R. 
29-30, 129) In particular, Appellants allege that State Farm breached its contractual and 
fiduciary duties to the Appellants by retaining Dr. Marble to perform a medical 
examination, and by relying upon Dr. Marble's findings to determine whether 
Appellants' medical expenses were reasonable and necessary. (R. 31-42, 129) 
Appellants asserted claims against State Farm for breach of contract, breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. (R. 31-42, 129) All of 
Appellants' claims are based on the contention that an insurer may not limit or deny PIP 
coverage based upon the results of a medical examination by a physician retained by the 
insurer. 
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State Farm responded to Appellants' Amended Complaint with a Motion to 
Dismiss filed on October 23, 2000. In support of its Motion to Dismiss, State Farm 
asserted that (1) an insurer lawfully may limit or deny PIP benefits to an insured based 
upon the findings of a medical examination by a physician retained by an insurer; and (2) 
Appellants' claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year statute of limitations 
governing insurance contracts. (R. 130) 
Appellants did not respond to State Farm's motion to dismiss. Instead, Appellants 
filed a motion to strike State Farm's motion to dismiss and a motion for partial summary 
judgment. (R. 239, 250) In support of their motion to strike, Appellants asserted that 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may not be used to challenge the 
underlying merits of a claim or to raise affirmative defenses, such as the statute of 
limitations, by motion. (R. 244) In support of their motion for partial summary 
judgment, Appellants asserted that State Farm may not limit or deny payment of PIP 
benefits on the grounds that the claimed medical expenses were neither reasonable nor 
necessary. (R. 256, 258) Appellants did not address the merits of State Farm's statute of 
limitations argument in either motion, except to say (incorrectly) that this type of defense 
may not be raised by motion under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 244-46) 
State Farm's motion to dismiss came before the trial court on January 22, 2001. 
The trial court considered the terms of the insurance policy under which Appellants were 
insured at the time of the accident. The trial court also considered the admissions of 
Appellants' counsel at argument. Because these matters were presented to and 
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considered by the trial court, the trial court exercised its discretion to treat State Farm's 
motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. On February 6, 2001, the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal With 
Prejudice, in which the court entered judgment in favor of State Farm on the basis of 
State Farm's motion to dismiss, denied Appellants' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion 
to Dismiss, and denied Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 628) The 
court held that Appellants had failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to limit 
or deny payment of PIP benefits to an insured based upon the findings of a medical 
examination by a physician retained by State Farm. (R. 631) The court also concluded 
that Appellants' claims against State Farm were barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations governing insurance contract actions. (R. 632) The court further concluded 
that Appellants first incurred their alleged losses in November 1996, when State Farm 
declined to pay the disputed PIP benefits. (R. 632-633) Appellants' claims, therefore, 
are barred because they did not file suit against State Farm until September 2000, nearly 
four years after the inception of the loss. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Each of Appellants' claims against State Farm rests upon the incorrect assumption 
that it is unlawful for State Farm to retain medical examiners to ascertain the 
reasonableness and/or necessity of claimed medical expenses, and to deny PIP benefits 
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based upon the results of those examinations. Appellants have asserted that State Farm's 
use of a medical examination to determine Appellants' PIP benefits constituted breach of 
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of 
fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and fraud. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Appellants' claims against State Farm are 
barred as a matter of law. In particular, the trial court correctly concluded State Farm 
lawfully may limit or deny PIP benefits based upon the findings of a medical examination 
by a physician retained by State Farm. Utah law does not limit or preclude the use of 
medical examinations by insurers; neither Utah courts nor those of any other jurisdiction 
Appellants purported to bring this suit on behalf of themselves and all other State Farm 
policy holders whose coverage has been limited or denied on the basis of the findings of a 
medical examination by a physician retained by State Farm. Appellants cannot establish 
the requisite elements to certify a class under Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which requirements include numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation. Nor can Appellants meet the requirements of Rule 23(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that common issues predominate over 
issues of individual fact. The unique circumstances pertaining to the injuries suffered by 
each proposed class member, the claimed medical expenses, the reasonableness and 
necessity of those claimed medical expenses, and the findings of the medical examiners 
retained by State Farm precludes any finding of commonality or typicality. See, e.g.. 
Hare v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:98 CV 65, at 7 (D. Ind., March 26, 2001) 
(refusing to certify class because "the possible claim of each potential member of the 
class would rest on unique, rather than common, questions of fact"); Ostrof v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civil No. PJM 99-2988, at 15-16, 19 (D. MA, May 21, 2001) 
(refusing to certify class because "the claims of the members of the putative class in this 
case would involve distinct inquiries leading to distinct conclusions as to each member") 
(Copies of these unpublished opinions are provided in the Addendum hereto). For these 
reasons, Appellants' proposed class fails under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359 9 
have held such examinations are unlawful. To the contrary, it is commonplace for an 
insurer to require an insured to undergo a medical examination to determine whether the 
insured's claimed medical expenses are reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident 
for which the insured seeks benefits. The Policy specifically permits medical 
examinations to assist the insurer in making this determination. In Pennington v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998), this Court implicitly approved the use of such 
medical examinations to limit or deny PIP benefits. Such examinations are not, as 
Appellants suggest, a means by which insurers wrongly deny PIP benefits to their 
insureds. 
The trial court also correctly concluded that Appellants' claims against State Farm 
are barred by the three-year statute of limitations governing insurance contracts. Under 
Utah law, a party must bring an action based upon a contract of first-party insurance 
within three years of the date of the inception of the loss. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-
313 (1999). The accident at issue in this lawsuit took place on August 5, 1994. 
Appellants first incurred their alleged losses in 1996, when State Farm declined to pay 
the disputed PIP benefits. Appellants did not file suit against State Farm until September 
12, 2000. Because Appellants did not file suit against State Farm within the three-year 
time frame governing actions based upon insurance contracts, Appellants' claims against 
State Farm are barred. 
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ARGUMENT 
Appellants have briefed no fewer than fourteen issues for consideration by this 
Court—many of which either are redundant or irrelevant. The only substantive issues 
that must be considered by this Court are whether the trial court correctly concluded that 
(1) State Farm lawfully may rely upon medical examinations to determine an insured's 
PIP benefits; and (2) Appellants' claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations governing insurance contracts. The trial court properly dismissed 
Appellants' claims on each of these grounds. 
I. STATE FARM LAWFULLY MAY RELY UPON MEDICAL 
EXAMINATIONS BY A PHYSICIAN RETAINED BY STATE FARM 
TO DETERMINE AN INSURED'S PIP BENEFITS 
Appellants' claims against State Farm rest on the purported legal principle that it 
is unlawful for an insurer to limit or deny PIP benefits based upon the results of an 
medical examination by a physician retained by the insurer. Appellants have failed to 
advance any authority to show that a properly conducted medical examination is 
unlawful, nor have Appellants provided the Court with any authority to show that 
properly conducted medical examinations constitute a violation of an insured's rights 
under an insurance policy, or a violation of the PIP provisions of any state's no fault 
statute. In fact, both the Utah Insurance Code and the Policy anticipate that State Farm 
and other insurers will conduct medical examinations to determine whether medical 
expenses are reasonable and necessary, and therefore payable. Utah's no fault statute 
provides PIP benefits to cover "the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary 
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359 11 
medical. . . services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person." Utah Code Ann. 31A-
22-307(l)(a) (1999). Appellants' insurance policy contains language to the same effect. 
(R. 153) The Policy also provides that an insured who makes a claim against the Policy 
shall "be examined by physicians chosen and paid by [State Farm] as often as [State 
Farm] reasonably may require." (R. 128, 149) Thus, under Utah law and the Policy, 
State Farm is obligated to reimburse Appellants only for those medical expenses that are 
reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident for which the insured seeks coverage. 
Like other insurers, State Farm uses medical examinations to determine whether an 
insured's treatment was necessary, and whether the charge was reasonable. 
Appellants contend that medical examinations by an insurer are unlawful because 
Utah's no fault statute does not expressly provide for the use of such examinations. What 
Appellants overlook is that nothing in Utah law precludes an insurer from conducting a 
medical examination in order to determine the PIP benefits due an insured. It is a basic 
maxim of statutory construction that "the best evidence of the true intent and purpose of 
the Legislature in enacting an Act is the plain language of the Act." Hebertson v. Bank 
One, 995 P.2d 7, 8 (Utah 1999). Had the Utah Legislature wanted to prohibit the use of 
medical examinations by an insurer, it could have included prohibitory language in the 
insurance code. It did not do so. The legislature's silence implies that it did not intend to 
preclude insurers from conducting medical examinations to determine the PIP benefits 
due an insured. "It can hardly be argued that an insurer cannot investigate what 
reasonably appears to be a questionable claim simply because the underlying statute 
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authorizing the coverage does not mention such investigative rights." See Morris v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co.. 287 S.E.2d 388, 396 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting plaintiffs claim 
that he was not required to undergo a medical evaluation because Georgia's "no fault" 
statute did not provide for such an evaluation). Medical examinations by physicians 
retained by insurers are a necessary correlative of the reasonable and necessary 
requirement of the no fault statute. Thus, even if the no fault statute does not expressly 
grant insurers the right to conduct medical examinations, that right must exist or the 
"reasonable and necessary" requirement would be rendered meaningless. 
Appellants observe that section 31A-22-309, Utah Code Ann. (1999), sets forth 
seven exclusions upon which an insurer may rely to limit or deny PIP benefits to an 
insured. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(2)(a) (1999). Appellants reason that since 
the conclusions of a medical examiner retained by an insurer are not referenced in any of 
these statutory exclusions, State Farm may not limit PIP benefits on such an examination. 
The "reasonable" and "necessary" requirements in the no fault statute, however, are not 
exclusions. Rather, they are statutory predicates to reimbursement for claimed medical 
expenses. An insurer's determination of what constitutes reasonable and necessary 
medical expenses must be made on a case-by-case basis. This is precisely why medical 
examinations are necessary. Otherwise, an insurer would be left with no choice but to 
take the word of its insured or the insured's treating physician at face value. 
The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly approved the use of medical examinations 
by an insured to limit or deny PIP benefits. In Pennington v. Allstate Insurance Co., 973 
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359 13 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court relied upon the findings of a medical 
examiner retained by the insurer to determine that plaintiff Lorin Pennington's claimed 
medical expenses were unnecessary and unreasonable. See id. at 937. Pennington 
alleged that he suffered injury as a result of an accident. Because his insurance agent had 
concerns about the validity of Pennington's claims, his insurer required him to undergo a 
medical examination by a physician retained by the insurer. Like the Policy in this case, 
Pennington's insurance policy required him to submit to medical examination by 
physicians chosen and paid for by his insurer. The medical examiner determined that 
Pennington had incurred medical expenses that were duplicative and unnecessary. Based 
upon the findings of the examiner, Pennington's insurer refused to pay for the duplicative 
and unnecessary expenses. See id. at 935-36. 
Pennington filed suit against his insurer, arguing that all of his medical expenses 
were necessary and reasonable. Based upon the results of the medical examination, the 
trial court determined that the disputed medical costs were unnecessary and unreasonable. 
See id. at 936. The trial court determined that Pennington and his attorney intentionally 
had incurred unnecessary medical expenses in an attempt to collect reimbursement for the 
same from the insurer. See id. This Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that 
Pennington incurred unnecessary medical expenses, relying in part upon the expert 
testimony of the medical examiner. The Court stated that, "[u]nder the terms of 
Pennington's insurance contract, [the insurer] was not required to pay unnecessary and/or 
unreasonable medical expenses." Id. at 938-39. 
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In Pennington, as in many other cases, the medical examination provided the sole 
means by which the insurer could determine whether the claimed medical expenses of its 
insured were legitimate. Such examinations often are the only means by which an insurer 
may determine whether an insured's claimed expenses are reasonable, necessary, and 
related to the accident. In Huntt v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 527 
A.2d 1333 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
emphasized this point, stating that: 
[w]hile [Maryland's no fault statute] was enacted in order to 
ensure prompt payment of PIP benefits without regard to 
fault, this does not mean that PIP coverage was intended to 
provide a PIP claimant with a blank check. Maryland's no 
fault statute, like those of other states, places a control on 
inflated or spurious claims by limiting the insurer's obligation 
to payment of'reasonable' expenses for 'necessary' services 
arising from the accident in question, (citation omitted). In 
our view, it would be impossible in many cases for an insurer 
to determine whether a PIP claimant's expenses were 
reasonable and for necessary services if the insurer could not 
require that the claimant be examined by a physician of its 
choice. 
IdL at 1336; see also Neal v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Minn. 
1995) (stating that, under no fault statute, insurer is obligated to pay designated benefits 
to its insured promptly, but insured is required to submit to an independent medical 
examination "so that the insurer may be assisted in its gathering of information to 
determine the nature and extent of the injury and loss"); Brito v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
687 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that Massachusetts no fault 
statute permits insurer, where it has reason to doubt its liability, to require a medical 
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examination by its own physician to assist in determining PIP coverage due, and stating 
that an "insurer is not required to pay medical bills merely on the unsubstantiated 
assertion by the claimant that they represent reasonable and necessary treatment for 
injuries caused by the accident"). 
It is undeniable that the "potential for fraud at the confluence of the medical, legal, 
and insurance industries is virtually unlimited." United States Sec. Ins. Co. v. Silva, 693 
So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Medical examinations by physicians retained 
by insurers are nothing more than precautionary measures "intended to protect insurers 
from those who would defraud them." Id., see also Verhaaren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1, 7 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that independent medical examinations 
"serve a legitimate purpose, affording the insurer a more objective accounting of the 
insured's injuries or damages"). Because of the danger of fraud and unnecessary 
expense, "insurance companies must be accorded wide latitude in their ability to 
investigate claims and to resist false or unfounded efforts to obtain funds not available 
under the contract of insurance." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 
1985). An insurer's ability to investigate claims necessarily includes the right to conduct 
medical examinations. 
For exactly these reasons, courts in other jurisdictions routinely permit insurers to 
conduct medical examinations, and to rely upon the results of those examinations to 
determine PIP coverage, so long as the terms of the insured's policy do not conflict with 
the provisions of the no fault statute. See, e.g., Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
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957 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1998) (stating that the "requirement that a claimant submit to a 
reasonably requested independent medical examination as a part of the claims process is 
discretionary and may be imposed at any time the claim is pending"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Eaton, 448 S.E.2d 652, 655 (Va. 1994) (stating that because the terms of the insurance 
policy did not conflict with provisions of no fault statute, the policy would be enforced as 
written, including requirement that claimant submit to an independent medical 
examination); New Jersey Coalition of Health Care Prof Is, Inc., et al. v. New Jersey 
Dep't of Banking and Ins., et al., 732 A.2d 1063, 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999); Albee v. 
Farmers Ins. Co., 967 P.2d 1, 4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that insurer has the right 
to conduct an independent medical examination and may condition its liability based 
upon that examination so long as it does not conflict with the provisions of the no fault 
statute). 
In sum, Utah law provides that an insurer need only reimburse those medical 
expenses that are reasonable and necessary. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-307(l)(a). 
Both the weight of authority and the language of Utah's no fault statute support the 
proposition that State Farm lawfully requested Appellants to undergo medical 
examinations and lawfully limited PIP benefits on the basis of those examinations. For 
these reasons, the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' claims against State Farm must be 
affirmed. 
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II. APPELLANTS' CLAIMS AGAINST STATE FARM ARE BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS 
The accident at issue in this lawsuit took place on August 5, 1994. Appellants first 
incurred their alleged losses in 1996, when State Farm declined to pay the disputed PIP 
benefits. Appellants did not file suit against State Farm until September 12, 2000. The 
trial court correctly concluded that Appellants claims against State Farm are barred 
because Appellants did not file suit against State Farm within the time frame set forth 
under the three-year statute of limitations governing insurance contracts. 
Under Utah law, a party must bring an action based upon a contract of first-party 
insurance within three years from the date of the inception of the loss. See Utah Code 
Ann. 31A-21-313 (1999). The term "first-party insurance" refers to an insurance 
agreement where the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses 
suffered by the insured. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Utah 
1985). In this instance, State Farm and the Appellants share a first-party insurance 
-2 
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-24 (1999) provides for a six-year statute of limitations on 
actions brought upon a written contract. Where two statutes of limitations conflict, the 
more specific statute prevails over the more general statute. See Lang v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co.. 196 F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Utah law and finding that three-year 
statute of limitations governing insurance claims, rather than six-year statute of 
limitations governing general contract actions, applied to plaintiffs causes of action). 
Thus, the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) 
controls Appellants' contract claims against State Farm. 
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relationship.4 
The commencement date of the statute of limitations for insurance contract actions 
hinges upon the definition of the phrase "inception of the loss." The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that the term "inception of the loss" in an insurance policy relates to the first 
moment that the loss is incurred. See Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Co., 21 Utah 2d 
173, 175, 442 P.2d 933, 934 (1968); see also Canadian Indem. Co. v. K & T. Inc.. 745 F. 
Supp. 661, 664 (D. Utah 1990) (applying Utah law and holding that statute of limitations 
for insurance contracts commences on the moment that the first loss is incurred). 
The trial court determined that Appellants first incurred their alleged losses in 
November 1996, when State Farm first declined to pay the disputed PIP benefits. (R. 
701) At the hearing on State Farm's motion to dismiss, Appellants' counsel conceded 
that Appellants first learned that State Farm had refused to pay all of their claimed 
medical expenses in November 1996, nearly four years before Appellants filed suit 
4
 Appellants contend that the parties share a third-party insurance relationship, and that, 
by virtue of this third-party relationship, State Farm owes Appellants a duty of 
indemnification. Appellants have improperly characterized the parties' relationship and 
State Farm's duty to Appellants. This Court has stated that "a third-party insurance 
contract obligates the insurer to defend the insured against claims made by third parties 
against the insured, and to pay any resulting liability, up to the specified dollar limit." 
See Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1995), quoting Beck, 701 
P.2d at 798 n.2. With respect to Appellants' PIP coverage, State Farm does not have a 
duty to defend Appellants against claims made by third parties. Rather, this dispute 
concerns State Farm's obligation to reimburse Appellants for claimed medical expenses. 
Thus, under the rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in the Beck case, the parties share a 
first-party insurance relationship. 
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against State Farm. (R. 700-01) The trial court concluded, therefore, that Appellants' 
claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. 
Appellants argue that they incurred their first loss when they began to incur 
attorneys fees for State Farm's alleged breach of the parties' insurance contract, and they 
rely on Canadian Indemnity to support this argument. Canadian Indemnity, however, 
concerned an insurer's alleged breach of the duty to defend, rather that the duty to pay 
medical expenses. The federal district court held that, in the context of a liability 
insurance policy, the statute of limitations commenced when the insured began to incur 
defense expenses. Canadian Indem. Co., 745 F. Supp. at 664. The analysis of the 
Canadian Indemnity court is not pertinent to this matter because the parties do not share a 
third-party insurance relationship and because State Farm does not have a duty to 
indemnify or defend Appellants. The Canadian Indemnity case is relevant only for its 
interpretation of the phrase "inception of the loss." 
Alternatively, Appellants contend that the "inception of the loss" should be based 
on State Farm's "unequivocal denial of'full' payment." Brief of Appellants at 42. 
Appellants argue that the parties, "by their agreement, were negotiating until State Farm 
positively denied payment on or about September 18, 1997." Id. Appellants assert that, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5), the statute of limitations was tolled until 
September 18, 1997, when State Farm "positively denied payment." Id. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5) provides that the statute of limitation "is tolled 
during the period in which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure 
prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to by the parties." Id. 
Appellants have not alleged that the parties agreed to conduct an appraisal, nor have 
Appellants alleged that the parties submitted this dispute to arbitration. Appellants 
suggest that the parties agreed to toll the statute of limitations while they negotiated the 
expenses for which State Farm would reimburse Appellants. There is no factual record to 
support Appellants' assertion that the parties negotiated payment of Appellants' claimed 
medical expenses. State Farm did not agree to negotiate payment of Appellants' claimed 
medical expenses with Appellants. Instead, State Farm retained Dr. Stephen Marble to 
conduct a medical examination to ensure that Appellants' claimed medical expenses were 
reasonable, necessary, and related to the August 5, 1994 accident. Dr. Marble concluded 
that some of Appellants' claimed medical expenses either were unreasonable or 
unnecessary, or were not related to the August 5, 1994 accident. In November 1996, on 
the basis of Dr. Marble's findings, State Farm reimbursed Appellants only for those 
expenses that were reasonable in value, necessary, and related to the August 5, 1994 
accident. At that time, State Farm communicated to Appellants that it would not provide 
additional benefits unless Appellants provided further information to State Farm about 
their claimed medical expenses. Plaintiffs did not provide any additional.information to 
State Farm. State Farm did not agree to negotiate with Appellants about payment of 
Appellants' claimed medical expenses, nor did State Farm agree to toll the statute of 
limitations. The trial court correctly concluded that Appellants' cause of action arose in 
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November 1996, when State Farm refused to reimburse Appellants for all of their 
claimed medical expenses. Accordingly, Appellants' claims against State Farm are 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
III. THE DUTIES OWED BY STATE FARM TO APPELLANTS ARE 
BASED ON THE PARTIES' CONTRACT AND DO NOT EXIST 
INDEPENDENTLY OF THAT CONTRACT 
Appellants argue that their claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and fraud are not governed by the 
three-year statute of limitations for insurance contracts. Regardless of how Appellants 
have characterized these claims, all of Appellants' claims rest in contract, not in tort. 
"In characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action 
and not the pleading labels chosen." Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 868 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). The court must examine "the true nature of the wrong and the injury as 
evidenced in the substance of the pleadings." Id. Examining the nature of Appellants' 
action, and Appellants' alleged injuries, it is clear that Appellants' claims are based upon 
the Policy. Any cause of action Appellants may have against State Farm arises out of the 
duties and obligations of the parties under that Policy. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). In Beck, plaintiff filed suit against his insurer, 
Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Farmers"), for breach of contract and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Beck contended that Farmers had acted 
maliciously toward him, with the intent of causing him emotional distress. The Court 
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stated that Beck and Farmers shared a first-party relationship, and that "in a first-party 
relationship between an insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties 
are contractual rather than fiduciary." Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. "Without more, a breach 
of those implied or express duties can give rise only to a cause of action in contract, not 
one in tort." Id. 
Beck recognized that other states permit a first-party insured to institute a tort 
action against an insurer who fails to bargain in good faith, but stated that 
the tort approach adopted by these courts is without a sound 
theoretical foundation and has the potential for distorting 
well-established principles of contract law. Moreover, the 
practical end of providing a strong incentive for insurers to 
fulfill their contractual obligations can be accomplished as 
well through a contract cause of action, without the analytical 
straining necessitated by the tort approach, and with far less 
potential for unforeseen consequences to the law of contracts. 
Id at 799.5 See also Gagon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 325, 325 (Utah 
1988) (stating that "an insurer's breach of its implied covenant to act in good faith toward 
its insured did not, alone, give rise to a cause of action in tort; rather, the cause of action 
was one in contract"); Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 
5
 The Court recognized that in some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may 
also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract, and may give rise to 
causes of action in tort. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. For example, the Court stated, 
"intentional and outrageous conduct by an insurer against its insured, coupled with a 
failure to bargain, could conceivably result in tort liability independent of (and concurrent 
with) liability for breach of contract." Id. The Appellants have not alleged, nor can they, 
that State Farm owed them any duties that exist independently of the Policy. Nor have 
Appellants alleged intentional and outrageous conduct, coupled with a failure to bargain, 
that would warrant concurrent contract and tort liability. 
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Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty 
running from the insurer to its insured). 
Thus, Appellants' claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and breach of fiduciary duty must be construed as contract claims, rather than tort 
claims. Appellants' claims for misrepresentation and fraud also must be construed as 
contract claims. Each of these claims is based upon the parties' insurance contract, and 
none of the duties and/or obligations allegedly owed to Appellants by State Farm exists 
independently of the insurance contract. Moreover, the no fault statute provides that 
"[t]he person entitled to [PIP] benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the 
expenses plus the applicable interest." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5). The no fault 
statute does not provide means by which a plaintiff may sue his insurer in tort. Because 
each of Appellants' claims against State Farm arises out of the parties' insurance 
contract, Appellants' claims against State Farm are barred by the applicable three-year 
statute of limitations. 
IV. STATE FARM'S RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION WAS AN APPROPRIATE 
VEHICLE FOR DECIDING THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE 
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants' claims 
against State Farm because, according to Appellants, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure may not be used to challenge the underlying merits of a claim or to raise 
affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations. Appellants have misconstrued the 
scope of Rule 12(b)(6). 
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A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is based upon a party's failure to state a claim for 
which relief may be granted. To prevail, the movant must show that the plaintiff cannot 
prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. See 2 
Moore's Federal Practice (3d ed. 2000) § 12.34[l][a]. A cause of action may be 
dismissed for failure to plead a necessary element, or for misstating or misapplying the 
law. In addition, a party's failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted may 
rest upon any number of affirmative defenses, including statute of limitations, statute of 
frauds, or laches. See id. at § 12.34[4][b]. 
Appellants contend that State Farm's motion to dismiss improperly addressed the 
merits of the Appellants' claim. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may be granted 
where, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulging 
all reasonable inferences in his favor, the plaintiff cannot state a claim for which relief 
may be granted. See Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 
(Utah 1996). Such is the case here. Appellants' claims against State Farm rest upon the 
incorrect assumption that it is unlawful for State Farm to conduct independent medical 
examinations of its insureds to determine whether the claimed medical expenses are 
reasonable and necessary. Under Utah law and the no fault statute, an insurer may 
conduct independent medical examinations and, indeed, may limit payment of PIP 
benefits to its insureds on the basis of those examinations. Appellants have failed to 
provide any authority to show otherwise. 
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Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in granting State Farm's 
motion to dismiss based upon State Farm's assertion that the statute of limitations had 
run. Utah courts routinely grant motions to dismiss based upon affirmative defenses, 
such as statutes of limitation. See Williams v. Howard et aL 970 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 
1998) (reversing trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss based upon statute 
of limitations); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995) (affirming Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff s libel claim against defendant on the ground that 
plaintiffs claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations); Nilson-Newey & Co. 
v. Utah Resources Int'l 905 P.2d 312, 312 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (affirming trial court's 
grant of defendant's motion to dismiss based on laches); Hansen v. Department of Fin. 
Insts., 858 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affirming order of district court granting 
defendant's motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations). See also 2 Moore's 
Federal Practice (3d ed. 2000) § 12.34[4][b] (stating that "[dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 
may also be appropriate when a successful affirmative defense or other bar to relief 
appears on the face of the complaint, such as the absolute immunity of a defendant, claim 
preclusion, or the statute of limitations"). Appellants have provided no support for the 
proposition that a party is precluded from raising an affirmative defense in a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. The trial court's dismissal of Appellants' claims against State Farm 
based upon the statute of limitations was appropriate. 
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V. STATE FARM'S USE OF MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS TO LIMIT 
OR DENY PIP BENEFITS DOES NOT VIOLATE UTAH'S OPEN 
COURTS CLAUSE 
Without any authority, Appellants argue that if State Farm is permitted to restrict 
PIP benefits to its insured on the basis of the findings of a medical examiner chosen and 
paid for by State Farm, the no fault statute will be rendered unconstitutional under the 
open courts provision in Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution. Appellants have 
misconstrued the scope and effect of the open courts clause, which provides that 
[a] 11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11; Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1997). The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a statute eliminating a previously existing common law 
remedy must provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy to comport with the requirements of the open courts clause. See Craftsman 
Builder's Supply. Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1200 (Utah 1999) (holding the 
builders statute of repose constitutional under open courts clause). If the statute does not 
provide an alternative remedy, "abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated artd the 
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for 
achieving the objective." Id. 
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The fatal flaw in Appellants' argument lies in their failure to point to a common 
law remedy that has been abrogated by the Utah no fault statute. To the contrary, all of 
Appellants' claims against State Farm are based on contract and on the no fault statute. 
The courts never have held that the open courts clause prevents the legislature from 
imposing conditions on statutory rights to relief. 
The open courts clause ensures that a party's right to relief under the common law 
is not abrogated by statute. The no fault statute does not abrogate Appellants' access to 
court, nor does it prevent Appellants from obtaining common law relief from anyone. 
The no fault statute expressly provides that a person entitled to benefits may bring an 
action against the tortfeasor who caused the injury, see Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l), 
and "may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses" to which he claims he is 
entitled. Id. at § 31A-22-309(5)(d). This is precisely what Appellants have done. Thus, 
State Farm legitimately may limit or deny PIP benefits on the basis of the findings of a 
medical examination by a physician retained by State Farm without running afoul of the 
open courts clause. Appellants have the right to contest any findings of their insurer, and 
to seek the appropriate relief in court. The open courts clause is not pertinent to this case. 
6
 Appellants' open courts clause argument also evidences a misunderstanding of the no 
fault statute. Appellants suggest that State Farm attempts to improperly inject an 
exclusionary provision into the no fault statute in an effort to avoid liability under the 
Appellants' policy. This argument is without support. Utah's no fault statute provides 
that insurers are liable only for the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical 
services. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-307(l). The "reasonable and necessary" test is 
not an attempt by State Farm to exclude coverage, as Appellants contend. It is, rather, a 
legislatively-mandated predicate to application of the statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants have failed to establish that it is unlawful for an insurer to rely upon 
the findings of a medical examination to limit or deny PIP benefits to an insured. 
Appellants also have failed to provide any just reason why the three-year statute of 
limitations governing insurance contract actions does not bar their claims against State 
Farm. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
Appellants' claims against State Farm. 
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TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
PART 3. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22 -307 (2001) 
§ 31A-22 -307 . Personal injury protection coverages and benefits 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, 
rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to 
exceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and loss of earning 
capacity per person from inability to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the 
loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the 
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days, 
for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that, but for the 
injury, the injured person would have performed for his household, except that this benefit 
need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury unless the person's inability 
to perform these services continues for more than two consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500 per person; and 
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total of 
$3,000. 
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided for in Subsection 
(1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309( l ) (a) (v) , the commissioner shall conduct a relative 
value study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state to assign a unit 
value and determine the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and accommodation. 
The study shall be updated every other year. In conducting the study, the department may 
consult or contract with appropriate public and private medical and health agencies or other 
technical experts. The costs and expenses incurred in conducting, maintaining, and 
administering the relative value study shall be funded by the tax created under Section 59-9-
105. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and publish a relative value 
study which sets forth the unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to each type of 
service and accommodation. 
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined by applying the 
unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the service or accommodation under 
the relative value study. I f a service or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 
75th percentile charge under the relative value study, the value of the service or 
accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or 
accommodation in the most populous county of this state. 
(c) This Subsection (2) does not preclude the department from adopting a schedule already 
established or a schedule prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the 
requirements of this Subsection (2). 
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any patterns of 
overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions by a health provider within 30 
days after such insurer has knowledge of such pattern. 
(e) (i) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of either party may 
designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed physicians to examine 
the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical 
services or expenses. 
(ii) An impartial medical panel designated under Subsection (2)(e)( i) shall consist of a 
majority of health care professionals within the same license classification and specialty as 
the provider of the claimant's medical services or expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection ( l ) ( a ) and in Subsection 31A-22-309( l ) 
(a)(v) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a recognized religious method of healing. 
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's spouse only the 
loss of gross income benefits of Subsection ( l ) (b ) ( i ) if the insured states in writing that: 
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse 
received any earned income from regular employment; and 
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the period of insurance, 
neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will receive earned income from regular 
employment. 
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance providing coverages 
greater than the minimum coverage required under this chapter nor does it require the 
segregation of those minimum coverages from other coverages in the same policy. 
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages required under this 
section. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 7 , enacted by L 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159; 
1989, ch. 261 , § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991, ch. 74, § 7; 1994, ch. 7 1 , § 1 ; 2001 , ch. 59, 
§ 2; 2001, ch. 116, § 67. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 2001 amendment by ch. 59, effective April 30, 2001 , corrected 
subsection references in Subsections (2)(a) and (3) and made a stylistic change. 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 116, effective April 30, 2001, added Subsection (2)(e)(i i) and 
made stylistic changes. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Allowable benefits. 
— Household services. 
— Loss of earnings. 
Arbitration panel. 
Dismissal of claim. 
Time computation. 
Tort claims. 
— Availability of insurance benefits. 
— Motorist's liability. 
ALLOWABLE BENEFITS. 
— HOUSEHOLD SERVICES. 
The phrase "and regardless of whether any of these expenses are actually incurred" in 
former version of this section was included to eliminate the necessity of proving such 
expenses and to prevent the insurer from claiming the benefit of services rendered 
gratuitously by friends or relatives which otherwise would have to be paid for; it did not 
require that reimbursement be made any time a family lost the services of one of its 
members regardless of the character of those services. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 
559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
Former provisions did not require insurer to pay the family of a twelve-year-old boy injured 
in an automobile accident $12 per day during the period of the boy's disablement as 
reimbursement for the value of lost services, which would have consisted of doing dishes, 
carrying out the garbage, washing the family car, and other similar chores because it was not 
reasonable to assume that the family would in fact have incurred expenses to perform the 
boy's chores, and so they were not entitled to reimbursement. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire 
Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
If a person is not "disabled" for purposes of loss of earnings benefits, neither is he 
"disabled" for purposes of household services benefits. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 
P.2d 609 (Utah 1979). 
The legislature intended to establish the mandatory household services benefit as an 
aggregate maximum of $20 per day of disability, up to a maximum of 365 days of disability, 
and not as an individual maximum of $20 on each day services are actually rendered. Tanner 
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
— LOSS OF EARNINGS. 
"Disability" refers to the inability to work; injured party who was able to work during the 
period for which disability benefits were sought and who earned more than $150 per week 
during the entire t ime for which benefits were sought was not entitled to disability benefits 
for loss of earnings. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979). 
A claimant who was unemployed at the time of his or her accident can collect disability 
benefits for lost wages from prospective employment only if the claimant establishes that a 
job was available for which the claimant was qualified and that the claimant would have 
taken that job. The legislature did not intend to provide compensation for "loss of earning 
capacity" unless a claimant has suffered a direct and specific monetary loss. Versluis v. 
Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). 
ARBITRATION PANEL. 
Failure to arbitrate a claim before a panel was not grounds for dismissal of plaintiff's 
complaint. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DISMISSAL OF CLAIM. 
This statute provides no basis on which to dismiss a claim. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
TIME COMPUTATION. 
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection ( l ) (b ) ( i ) runs from the loss of gross income 
and loss of earning capacity, not from the date of the accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to 
suffer loss of income and loss of earning capacity until six months after an accident and 
continued to suffer that loss for a period exceeding the maximum benefit of 52 weeks was 
improperly denied coverage when the trial court only provided for coverage for 52 weeks 
following the date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
TORT CLAIMS. 
- AVAILABILITY OF INSURANCE BENEFITS. 
No-fault benefits are available to those who sustain serious injury even though they remain 
free to pursue a tort claim as well; however, the injured person is not entitled to a double 
recovery from the tort-feasor and under no-fault for a single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), see also Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978 
P.2d 460. 
Where insured brought action against his no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault 
benefits after receiving benefits from the no-fault insurer and obtaining a judgment against a 
third-party tort-feasor, insured was collaterally estopped from recovering additional no-fault 
benefits in the form of lost wages but was not collaterally estopped from recovering for 
household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
- MOTORISTS LIABILITY. 
A party having the security required under this section is granted partial tort immunity and 
is not personally liable for the benefits provided hereunder; he remains liable for customary 
tort claims, such as general damages and economic losses not compensated by the benefits 
paid hereunder, if the threshold provisions of § 31A-22-309 are met. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 
606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 6 0 CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 113. 
A.L.R. —Validity and construction of "no-fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 229. 
Validity of state statute prohibiting health providers from the practice of waiving patients' 
obligation to pay health insurance deductibles or copayments, or advertising such practice, 8 
A.L.R.5th 855. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21 -313 (2001) 
§ 31A-21 -313 . Limitation of actions 
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance must be commenced 
within three years after the inception of the loss. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this t i t le, the law applicable to 
limitation of actions in Title 78, Chapter 12, Limitation of Actions, applies to actions on 
insurance policies. 
(3) An insurance policy may not: 
(a) limit the time for beginning an action on the policy to a t ime less than that authorized 
by statute; 
(b) prescribe in what court an action may be brought on the policy; or 
(c) provide that no action may be brought, subject to permissible arbitration provisions in 
contracts. 
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant will arise from 
a delay in bringing suit against an insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay itself, no 
action may be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to compel payment under 
the policy until the earlier of: 
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the policy; 
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or 
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment. 
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the parties conduct an 
appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to 
by the parties. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 3 1 A - 2 1 - 3 1 3 , enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 149; 
1996, ch. 193, § 2. 
NOTES: 
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AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection (1) 
added "first party"; in Subsection (2) added "Limitation of Actions"; and made two stylistic 
changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Operation of section. 
Timeliness. 
When loss occurs. 
Cited. 
OPERATION OF SECTION. 
Action for breach of the insurer's duty to defend was controlled by the three-year period of 
this section, which, although not yet enacted when the policy was issued, was in effect at the 
time the cause of action accrued. Canadian Indem. Co. v. K & T , Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661 (D. 
Utah 1990), a f f d , 953 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1992). 
A long-term disability plan is subject to the 3-year limitation period applicable to claims for 
denial of insurance benefits, not the 6-year period applicable to claims for breach of contract. 
Moore v. Berg Enters., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Utah 1998). 
The statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs claim under the federal retirement 
income security statute was § 31A-21-313(1 ) since, although the claim was based upon a 
contract, it was more precisely based upon a contract of insurance. Lang v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co., 196 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 1999). 
TIMELINESS. 
The cross-claim, to the extent that it sought contribution for sums the insurance company 
paid in defending the plaintiff, related back to the date of the filing of the original complaint 
and was therefore timely filed. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 
(Utah 1997). 
WHEN LOSS OCCURS. 
The "inception of the loss" language in Subsection (1) means that the limitations period 
should begin to run when the first loss is incurred. In a suit for an alleged breach of an 
insurer's duty to defend, the insured's first loss occurs when the insured first incurs defense 
expenses. Canadian Indem. Co. v. K & T , Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661 (D. Utah 1990), a f f d , 953 
*F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1992). 
CITED in Imperial Sav. Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Utah 1990); Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AM. JUR. 2D. - 4 4 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1876 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 4 6 A C.J.S. Insurance § 1544 et seq. 
A.L.R. —Application to period of limitation fixed by contract, of statute permitting new action 
to be brought within specified time after failure of prior action for cause other than on the 
merits, 16 A.L.R.3d 452. 
Time when period provided for in suicide clause of life or accident policy begins to run, 37 
A.L.R.3d 933. 
Insurer's failure to pay amount of admitted liability as precluding reliance on statute of 
limitations, 41 A.L.R.3d 1111. 
Fraud, misrepresentation, or deception as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 43 
A.L.R.3d 429. 
Limitation of action against insurer for breach of contract to defend, 96 A.L.R.3d 1193. 
When statute of limitations commences to run on automobile no-fault insurance personal 
injury claim, 36 A.L.R.4th 357. 
Value of insured's assets as limitation, in action by insured or insured's assignee for liability 
insurer's wrongful failure to defend, on recovery of amount of judgment against insured in 
excess of policy amount, 36 A.L.R.4th 922. 
Policy provision limiting time within which action may be brought on the policy as 
applicable to tort action by insured against insurer, 66 A.L.R.4th 859. 
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Sec, 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const. 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Actions by court. 
Actions by state. 





- Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Debt collection. 
Discriminatory classification. 
District court jurisdiction. 
Election contest. 
Forum non conveniens. 
Health care professional immunity. 
Injury or damage to property. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Land Registration Act. 
Limitations. 
- Choses in action. 
- Habeas corpus. 
- Limitation of actions. 
- Statutory limitation of review. 
No-fault statute. 
Occupational disease law. 
Prisoners. 
- Assessment of civil fees and costs. 
- Malpractice actions. 
Remedies. 
Removal to federal court. 
Requirement of deposit. 
Sovereign immunity. 
Statutes of repose. 
Torts. 
- Action by wife against husband. 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis^ Group. All rights reserved. 
- Criminal conversation. 
- Loss of consortium. 
Unlicensed law practice. 
Waiver of rights. 
Workers1 compensation law. 
Cited. 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et seq., is vestec 
originally in the federal courts, but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by state courts is not thereb; 
prohibited; in view of the provisions of this section, therefore, it was error for trial court to dismiss for lad 
of jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utal 
1977). 
Trial court would not err in dismissing action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the ground of forun 
non conveniens in a proper case, but such dismissal should be without prejudice so that the plaintiff migh 
move his suit to another forum without harm to his claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977). 
Actions by court. 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond c 
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & Trust Co., 5< 
Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.LR. 1119 (1919). 
Actions by state. 
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested in the state, whicl 
alone can exercise sovereign powers; therefore, it does not prevent the state from reserving to itself th< 
sole right to bring actions for the dissolution of building and loan associations. Union Sav. & Inv. Co. \ 
District Court, 44 Utah 397,140 P. 221, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 821 (1914). 
Actions not created. 
This section does not create new rights, or give new remedies where none otherwise are given, bi 
places a limitation upon Legislature to prevent that branch of the state government from closing the door 
of the courts against any person who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with som 
known remedy. Therefore, where no right of action is given or no remedy exists, under either the commo 
law or some statute, this section creates none. Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 1916A L.R./ 
1140(1915). 
Arbitration. 
The amendment of the arbitration statute to permit valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration < 
future disputes does not violate this section. Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Uta 
1981). 
An insurer and its adjuster could not bind the insured to arbitrate any claim against the insured for an 
amount in excess of the policy limits; to do so would violate the insured's right of access to the courl 
under this section. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998). 
Assignments. 
In action for dairy products sold, plaintiff who was assignee of claim could bring action thereon even 
claim was assigned for purpose of having action brought thereon. Perkes v. Utah Idaho Milk Co., 85 Uts 
217, 39 P.2d 308 (1934). 
Attorneys1 duties. 
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This section means that courts are open for the purpose of having any order or judgment assailed in 
the proper manner and at the proper time, so that attorney with reasonable cause may act in good faith 
and challenge an order he believes to be in excess of the court's jurisdiction. In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 
190 P. 952 (1920). 
Criminal law. 
- Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Former section providing that no judge, tribunal, or officer other than those mentioned therein could 
suspend execution of judgment of death except sheriff as provided in succeeding sections with reference 
to inquiry as to insanity of defendant did not violate this section. State ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 
Utah 376, 49 P.2d 408 (1935). 
Debt collection. 
To collect past-due claim in court is right guaranteed by Constitution. Karenius v. Merchants' 
Protective Ass'n, 65 Utah 183, 235 P. 880 (1925). 
Discriminatory classification. 
A statutory classification that discriminates against a person's constitutionally protected right to a 
remedy for personal injury under this section is constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than 
a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a 
valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal. Lee ex 
rel. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993). 
District court jurisdiction. 
The district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil 
and criminal, not excepted and prohibited by the Constitution. Brady v. McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P. 
188(1921). 
District courts are courts of original jurisdiction having jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law or 
the Constitution, but one district court cannot exercise power or control over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 
92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937). 
Election contest. 
There is no intimation herein that courts are given power to pass on purely political questions, but it is 
clearly stated that courts are always open for the enforcement of such rights and redress of such wrongs 
as from time immemorial have been considered as proper for courts to consider. The power to consider 
political questions and the vindication of rights growing out of or incidental to such questions is not an 
inherent power of the courts. Courts can exercise powers respecting political matters only to the extent 
and in the manner provided by legislature, and election contest is not within jurisdiction of court of equity in 
absence of statute. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 P. 1049 (1926). 
Forum non conveniens. 
Utah state courts may apply doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions arising under Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950). 
While courts have inherent power to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction when convinced that to do so 
would work hardship on some or all the litigants, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be invoked 
only where it appears that plaintiff has selected an inconvenient forum for the purpose of annoying and 
harassing defendant, or where factors such as the location of the principal parties, ease of access to 
proof, availability of witnesses, etc., so strongly preponderate in favor of holding the trial somewhere else 
that to deny a motion to dismiss would work great hardship on defendant. Summa Corp. v. Lancer Indus. 
Inc., 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977). 
Health care professional immunity. 
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Section 58-13-2, which affords immunity to a physician rendering emergency medical care at the 
scene of an emergency occurring in a hospital if the physician is under no preexisting duty to do so, does 
not violate this section. Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., 948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997). 
Injury or damage to property. 
A right of action exists for any injury or damage to private property, and neither the legislature nor 
municipalities can interfere with that right. Lewis v. Pingree Natl Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C 
LR.A. 1260(1915). 
Intoxicating liquor. 
The liquor nuisance sections of the former Liquor Control Act did not contravene this section. Riggins 
v. District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935). 
Depriving a holder of a state liquor store lease of his liquor store without notice, hearing, or any judicial . 
review offends against both the guarantee of due process and the guarantee of access to the courts. 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). 
Land Registration Act. 
The Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as conferring judicial powers on registrar of titles. 
Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752 (1920). 
. Limitations. 
Former Section 78-15-3, a limitations provision in the Utah Product Liability Act which barred actions 
without regard to when an injury occurred and was not designed to provide a reasonable time within which 
to file a lawsuit, was unconstitutional because it violated this section and the constitutional prohibition 
against abrogation of wrongful death actions. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1986). 
The former architects and builders statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional under this 
section because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy was arbitrary and 
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989). 
The former Utah architects and builders statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional under 
this section because it denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property caused by a latent defect. 
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
Subsection 78-12-25(3), which provides a four-year statute of limitations on "an action for relief not 
otherwise provided by law,M does not violate this section. McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 835 
(D. Utah 1989), affd, 927 F.2d 1125 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 894, 112 S. Ct. 263, 116 L Ed. 2d 
217(1991). 
- Choses in action. 
Because the acquisition of a legal malpractice claim by the law firm against which it was filed would 
have the effect of denying the claimant his right to a trial on his claim, and where there would be no 
prejudice suffered by the firm, since any judgment recovered would be offset against the legitimate 
amounts owed the firm, the public's interest in a legal system and legal profession that is just in both 
appearance and fact supported the setting aside of the acquisition of the chose by the firm. Snow, Nuffer, 
Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, 980 P.2d 208. 
- Habeas corpus. 
The three-month limitation period in § 78-12-31.1 is an unreasonable limitation on the constitutional 
right to petition for a habeas corpus writ that violates rights under this section to seek a civil remedy in 
state courts. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 
1994). 
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- Limitation of actions. 
This section does not preclude the legislature from prescribing a statute of limitations for time within 
which to assail the regularity or organization of an irrigation district. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P. 
555(1915). 
The statute of limitations in § 35-1-99 does not, on its face, manifest a denial of justice to overcome its 
presumption of constitutionality; when a petitioner knew of his injury within the limitations period, the 
section did not violate this section. Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
- Statutory limitation of review. 
Former act authorizing improvement districts for water or sewage systems did not violate this section 
on the ground that it limited or prohibited review by the courts. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 
274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950). 
This section does not prevent the abolition of obsolete causes of action. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 
P.2d8(Utah1991). 
No-fault statute. 
The no-fault statute, § 31A-22-309, satisfies this provision because it not only provides a tort victim 
with a reasonable and alternative remedy, but also eliminates a clear social or economic evil. Warren v. 
Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Occupational disease law. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in excluding compensation for partial disability from silicosis, and 
in rendering remedy under that act exclusive so as to abrogate common-law right of action therefor, was 
not unconstitutional as depriving employee of his remedy by due course of law for injury done to his 
person. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (1948), appeal 
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L. Ed. 411 (1948). 
Prisoners. 
- Assessment of civil fees and costs. 
Section 64-13-23(5), directing a court to determine the amount of a prisoner's funds available for 
payment of filing fees and costs, does not unreasonably limit a prisoner's right to bring a petition for 
extraordinary relief. Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
- Malpractice actions. 
Sections 63-30-4 and 63-30-10, precluding prisoners from bringing negligence actions against the 
state or prison physicians, are constitutional: while prisoners' status as felons does not justify divesting 
them of all of their rights, it does play a role in determining whether the statutory classification of prisoners 
apart from other members of society is constitutional. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996). 
Remedies. 
Where, for a period of a year and a day, the plaintiff had been barred by legislative enactments from 
all actions of the type asserted by her against a government agency and its employees, where the 
legislature had provided no alternative remedy, and where there was no clear state social or economic evil 
to be obviated by the abrogation of remedies, the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated, and reversal 
of summary judgment was required. Day v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, 980 P.2d 
1171. 
Removal to federal court. 
Rights of litigants under this section must yield to the right of diverse defendants under federal 
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removal statutes. Copier ex rel. Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Requirement of deposit. 
To the extent that § 59-1-505, requiring a taxpayer to deposit the amount in dispute in order to obtain 
judicial review of a tax commission decision, precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the 
open courts provision of this section and is unconstitutional as applied to an indigent taxpayer. However, 
the statutory requirement is not unconstitutional in all cases; for example, when a taxpayer is able to meet 
the requirement, the deposit must be paid. Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992). 
Sovereign immunity. 
Sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under this section. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 
1983); DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), affd sub nom. DeBry v. Noble, 889 
P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). 
This section is implicated only if a statute denies a person the right to sue the state when the state 
performs a nongovernmental function. The University of Utah performs a governmental function under the 
test developed in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (1980), and has immunity under § 
63-30-10(2), immunizing government entities from suit from injuries arising out of an assault or battery; 
thus, the immunity act was not unconstitutional as applied to a person who was injured when assaulted 
and struck by an employee of the University. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
Acts that are core governmental functions or are unique to government are outside the protection of 
this section; thus, in an action against a county building official and the county for injuries based on 
negligent inspection of a building and fraudulent issuance of a building permit, the defendants' acts were 
core governmental functions within the scope of the exceptions to waiver of immunity in Subsections (3) 
and (4) of § 63-30-10. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). 
Statutes of repose. 
Given the clear social and economic evils identified by the legislature in enacting the builders' statute 
of repose, § 78-12-25.5, and the remote chance of injury or damage after a period of years, the statute is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating the stated evils, and is constitutional under this 
section. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194. 
Torts. 
- Action by wife against husband. 
Doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not bar wife's action against husband for the intentional 
infliction of personal injuries. Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). 
- Criminal conversation. 
Abolition of the tort of criminal conversation does not violate the open courts provision. Norton v. 
Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991). 
- Loss of consortium. 
The Married Women's Act of 1898 (§ 30-2-4) was a reasonable legislative enactment intended and 
reasonably tailored to place men and women on equal footing with respect to their ability to bring actions 
for their own injuries and to extinguish the concept that a wife was the property of her husband. If, in the 
process, the husband's right to sue for loss of his wife's consortium, which may have never existed in 
Utah, was abolished, that abolition was not an unreasonable step. Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869 (Utah 
1988). 
Unlicensed law practice. 
This section does not render unconstitutional statute making practice of law without a license a crime. 
Legislature has the power to declare acts of unauthorized practice of law to be illegal, and to punish 
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violations thereof by fine and imprisonment. But the right to appear in person and prosecute or defend a 
cause to which one is a party cannot be abrogated either by the Legislature or the courts. Nelson v. Smith, 
107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634, 157 A.LR. 512 (1944). 
Waiver of rights. 
Right to apply to courts for redress of wrong is substantial right, and will not be waived by contract 
except through unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486,251 P. 16 (1926). 
Workers' compensation law. 
Employers are entitled to have recourse to courts under Workmen's Compensation Act concerning 
question of their ultimate liability. Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825 (1918). 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid because it delegates to industrial commission the power 
to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property 
rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122 (1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of third party, a stranger to employment, are not limited to 
recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to 
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 (1927). 
The eight-year time limitation on temporary total disability benefits in the Worker's Compensation Law 
is not an unconstitutional statute of repose. Stoker v. Workers' Comp. Fund, 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Middlestadt v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 
1993); Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 
UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171. 
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State Rules 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART I I I . PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
URCP Rule 12 (2001) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a 
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and 
complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons 
and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-
claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall 
serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer 
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the 
order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as 
follows, unless a different t ime is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer 
than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining 
claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) I f the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall 
be served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether 
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of 
the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency 
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure 
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before 
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by 
further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. I f a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on 
a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time 
as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated ( l ) - (7) in subdivision (b) of 
this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned 
in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any 
party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until 
the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a 
responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a 
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details 
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike 
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no 
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty 
days after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any 
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it 
the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under 
this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available which this 
rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on 
any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by 
motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the 
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, 
if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, 
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the 
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection 
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of 
any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any 
motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of 
this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff 
to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon 
hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall 
order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security 
shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered 
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, 
enter an order dismissing the action. 
HISTORY: Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1 , 1990; November 1 , 2000. 
NOTES: 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment in Subdivision (a) added the language beginning 
"within the state and within thirty days" at the end of the first sentence and "but a motion 
directed" at the end of the last sentence, and made stylistic changes throughout. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Rule 12, F.R.C.P. 
Cross References. — Motions generally, U.R.C.P. 7. 
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Cited. 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
When urging the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction based only on documentary 
evidence, a plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing that the trial court has personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in order to proceed to trial on the merits. 
Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 
U.S. 900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L Ed. 2d 228 (1991). 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
— Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the 
pleadings and if the court considers them the other party must have the privilege of offering 
answering affidavits as upon a motion for summary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. v. 
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953). 
Rights of opposing party. 
On review of a motion on the pleadings treated as a motion for summary judgment under 
Subdivision (c), the party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have 
all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light 
most favorable to him. Young v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958). 
Motion for more definite statement. 
— Bill of particulars. 
A motion for a more definite statement, and not discovery procedures, is the appropriate 
means of obtaining the information formerly sought by a bill of particulars. Securities Credit 
Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953). 
— Criteria. 
A motion for a more definite statement is properly made only when the complaint is 
indefinite, ambiguous, or vague in either factual allegations or legal theory to such an extent 
that the moving party cannot reasonably be required to frame his responsive pleading. Liquor 
Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
— Motion to dismiss distinguished. 
Where the complaint states a claim in general language but is not sufficiently definite in 
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certain respects to enable defendant to answer, the proper remedy is a motion for a more 
definite statement, not a motion to dismiss. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 
243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
— Purpose. 
Delay. 
A motion for a more definite statement should be summarily dealt with if made for the 
purpose of delay. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
Obtaining evidence. 
Motions for a more definite statement are not properly used to obtain evidence from the 
pleader. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
— Explained. 
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) admits the facts alleged in the complaint but 
challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 
1995). 
— Habeas corpus. 
Although Rule 65B generally governs the drafting, fi l ing, and disposition of habeas corpus 
petitions, Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule applies to habeas corpus petitions in which petitioner 
fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987 
(Utah 1997). 
— Improper. 
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was reversed because the record did not persuade the 
appeals court that there was no set of facts under which the defendant might succeed. Olson 
v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (claim of unjust enrichment if 
no reimbursement for payment made on loan guarantee). 
In a wrongful death action based on attractive nuisance doctrine, the term "aquatic trap" in 
complaint could reasonably be construed to refer to a hidden trap and complaint was 
sufficiently descriptive. Whipple ex rel. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 
1218 (Utah 1996). 
Complaint for wrongful death, alleging that the injuries and death occurred because of a 
defective irrigation ditch and its associated channelling devices, bridges, currents, and 
trappings and that as a further direct and proximate result of the defective and unreasonably 
dangerous condition of the irrigation ditch, plaintiffs suffered damages for loss of financial 
support, comfort, society, advice, care, companionship, affection and happiness of association 
of the decedent, contained allegations of causation sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996). 
The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs case because her allegation of facts 
concerning each element of the claim of breach of contract was sufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss. Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
— Standard. 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in 
his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v. 
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
— Standard of review. 
When reviewing a judgment entered on a motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) , the 
Court of Appeals is obliged to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. Heiner v. S J . Groves & Sons 
Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) will be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty 
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). 
When reviewing a dismissal under this rule, an appellate court must accept the material 
allegations of the complaint as true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v. 
Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 
P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Wright v. University 
of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the appellate court 
gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Wright v. University 
of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 
1995); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996). 
In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate 
court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows v. 
State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1996). 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
— Forum-selection clause in contract. 
The parties' prior agreement in the contract that is the subject of the dispute as to the place 
of the action will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail 
Sys., 868 P.2d 809 (Utah 1993). 
A plaintiff who brings an action in violation of a choice-of-forum provision bears the burden of 
proving that enforcing the clause is unfair or unreasonable; to meet this burden, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the chosen state would be so seriously an inconvenient forum that to 
require the plaintiff to bring suit there would be unjust. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., 868 
P.2d 809 (Utah 1993). 
Presentation of defenses. 
— How presented. 
Affirmative defenses. 
Since an affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case, 
any matter that does not tend to controvert the opposing party's prima facie case should be 
pleaded and is not put in issue by denial pursuant to Rule 8(b). Gill v. T imm, 720 P.2d 1352 
(Utah 1986). 
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act (§ 57-14-1 et seq.) is an "affirmative defense" or an 
"avoidance" in a wrongful death action alleging negligence, and, to preserve the act as a 
defense, it must be raised in the defendant's answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 
793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
Divorce. 
Trial court did not err in refusing defendant's motion to dismiss and for a more definite 
statement in answer to plaintiff's divorce petition alleging cruelty and habitual intoxication in 
general terms. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). 
Election of remedies. 
The defense of election of remedies is an affirmative one that must be raised by way of 
answer, motion, or demand and may not be raised for the first t ime on appeal. Royal 
Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979). 
Failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted. 
A complaint does not fail to state a claim unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff 
would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the 
claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952); Christensen v. 
Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970). 
A complaint is required to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved, or it is subject 
to dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475 
P.2d 1019 (1970). 
Action against city for breach of implied contract was properly dismissed for failure to state 
claim upon which relief could be granted, since the contract to review bids on an equal basis 
was too nebulous to be enforceable, and the city is immune to tort action for deceit. Rapp v. 
Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). 
In an unlawful detainer action in which the notice is defective, the defective notice results in 
a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted rather than lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979). 
General and special appearances. 
The distinction between general and special appearances has been abolished by Subdivision 
(b) of this rule. Ted R. Brown & Assocs, v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976). 
Statute of frauds. 
The defense of the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded 
pursuant to Rule 8(c) and may not be raised by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision 
(b) of this rule. W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970). 
Venue. 
A motion to dismiss is not the correct form for objecting to venue improperly laid; an 
objection to venue should be made by a motion for change of place of tr ial. Cannon v. Tuft, 3 
Utah 2d 410, 285 P.2d 843 (1955). 
— When presented. 
Amended answer. 
Motion for leave to file an amended answer was properly denied where movant failed to file 
anything in support of the motion and did not call the motion for hearing until the case was 
called for trial four months later. Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271 , 470 P.2d 257 (1970). 
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
— Failure to file. 
An objection raised that security for costs was not filed within one month after notice is at 
best but a technical one. Dismissal of action with prejudice was an abuse of discretion since 
the policy of the law is to minimize the effect of technical objections which do not go to the 
merits and are not prejudicial to the interests of the parties. Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett 
D. Ford Contractors, 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P.2d 191 (1954). 
Where plaintiff died 16 days after initiating suit, and 11 days after demand of a nonresident 
cost bond under Subdivision ( j ) , and, though almost three months later, a surety bond was 
filed as soon as an administrator was appointed, trial court should not dismiss action for 
failure to file bond within 30 days. Hammond v. Calder, 8 Utah 2d 333, 334 P.2d 562, cert, 
denied, 361 U.S. 813, 80 S. Ct. 5 1 , 4 L Ed. 2d 60 (1959). 
Standard of review. 
The propriety of a dismissal under this rule is a question of law, reviewable for correctness. 
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, 987 P.2d 602. 
Summary judgment. 
— Conversion of motion to dismiss. 
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision (b)(6) may be converted to summary judgment 
only when it appears as a matter of law that the plaintiff cannot recover; and where there 
was a question of actual knowledge of defendant as to the claim against the property, motion 
to dismiss and summary judgment were improper. Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 
1975). 
Motion for dismissal in action for declaratory judgment as to constitutionality and legality of 
annexation conditions properly treated as motion for summary judgment. See Child v. City of 
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975). 
I t is generally not well advised to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977). 
Where defendant's motion was initially for dismissal because of plaintiff's failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, once matters outside the pleadings were presented 
to and not excluded by the trial court, the motion was properly treated as one for summary 
judgment Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 
P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). 
If a trial court cannot on its own motion convert a Rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 
motion for summary judgment, then certainly the Supreme Court should not allow the 
moving party to do so on appeal. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
When affidavits or other evidence is presented to support a motion to dismiss under 
Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule and the court does not exclude them, the motion is generally 
treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56. DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, 
Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996). 
This rule does not convert motions based on subdivisions (b)(1) through (5) into motions for 
summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating to the 
basis for the motion. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P.2d 36. 
— Court's discretion. 
If a motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) is presented, the decision to consider matters 
outside the pleadings initially lies in the discretion of the trial court. Strand v. Associated 
Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
— Court's initiative. 
A court should not, on its own initiative, try to convert a motion for dismissal into one for 
summary judgment by requesting additional evidence. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc., 
25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970). 
— Defenses. 
Defenses which have not been raised by the answer or by proper motion may not be raised in 
an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). 
— Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
Once the trial court makes a determination to consider materials outside the pleading upon a 
motion to dismiss, the mandatory provision of Subdivision (b) controls and all parties must 
be given adequate notice and opportunity to submit supporting materials, particularly the 
party against whom the motion has been made. Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of 
Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
I t is necessary that the record clearly and affirmatively demonstrate that, when a motion to 
dismiss is made and matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, all parties are given reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent material if 
they wish. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978). 
— Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
I t only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on other side of controversy and 
create issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1975). 
Waiver of defenses. 
— Defect of parties. 
Any objection to a defect of parties is waived, if not asserted by a party as provided in 
Subdivision (h). Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976). 
— Defective service of process. 
The affirmative defense of defective service of process was waived by defendant, who failed 
to raise the defense in its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and did not raise the issue 
during a summary judgment hearing, but raised it for the first t ime on appeal. Watkiss & 
Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs' failure to comply with the indorsement provision 
of § 78-36-8, which requires court indorsement of the summons, barred their action under 
Utah's forcible entry and detainer statute. Defendant, by answering plaintiffs' complaint 
without raising the defense of insufficiency of process and by proceeding through trial and the 
verdict before raising that defense, waived it under Subdivision (h) of this rule. Fowler v. 
Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
-- Exceptions. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be waived by 
the parties. This prohibition against waiver applies only to subject matter jurisdiction and is 
consistent with federal law. Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243 (Utah 1993). 
When issues raised. 
Issues brought under the exceptions of Subdivision (h) may be raised before or during trial. 
Subdivision (h) does not mean that failure to state a claim can be raised for the first t ime on 
appeal. Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985). 
— Failure to join indispensable party. 
When a party asserts the defense of failure to join an indispensable party for the first t ime at 
the trial on the merits, it should be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b). Papanikolas Bros. 
Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975). 
— Failure to pay consideration. 
Failure to pay consideration on a negotiable instrument is an affirmative defense which is 
required, under Rule 8(c), to be pleaded; and unless it is pleaded, pursuant to Subdivision 
(h) of this rule, it ordinarily will be considered waived as a defense, unless there is a motion 
to amend, or the parties acquiesce in the trial of that issue, or the plaintiff is otherwise given 
notice and an opportunity to meet the issue. Olpin v. Grove Fin. Co., 521 P.2d 1221 (Utah 
1974). 
— Mutual mistake. 
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima facie 
case, and the failure to assert it is a waiver of that defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. 
Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
— Statute of frauds. 
The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the pleadings, else 
it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983). 
— Statute of limitations. 
In an action by water user challenging charges of water district, plaintiff waived thirty-day 
limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by failing to plead it in answer to defendant's counterclaim. 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962). 
The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive 
pleading, or it is waived, unless an amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed 
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 
664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). 
— Waiver. 
Where plaintiff sought to rescind a contract to purchase a business from defendant on ground 
that the agreement was procured by fraud, and defendant claimed that any fraud had been 
waived by plaintiffs continued operation of the business, the allegation of waiver was an 
affirmative defense which should have been pleaded, and failure to do so constituted a waiver 
of the defense under this rule. Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 
1976). 
Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah 377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Town of North 
Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 (1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 
305 P.2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P.2d 924 
(1968); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 1980); Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172 
(Utah 1981); Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah 1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694 
P.2d 612 (Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Rothey v. Walker Bank 
& Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 
P.2d 935 (Utah 1988); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989); Weber v. 
Snyderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
1991); Moffitt v. Barr, 837 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry v. Valley Mtg. Co., 835 
P.2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cruz v. 
Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek 
Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); Valley Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 P.2d 361 
(Utah 1997); Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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Biputy Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE VOY TUCKER and MARIAN TUCKER, 
individually and on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, STEPHEN P. MARBLE, 
M.D., MA YE HELEN POTTER, and FARMERS j 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, . 
Defendants. 
Case No. 980907369 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
On January 22, 2001, Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's 
("State Farm") Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint came for hearing before the Court, with the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment also came before the Court. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Trent J. Waddoups. Defendant State Farm was represented by Alan L. Sullivan 
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and Adrianne Goldsmith. The Court has considered the terms of the insurance policy under 
which the plaintiffs were insured at the time of the accident. The Court also has considered the 
admissions of plaintiffs' counsel at argument. Because these matters have been presented to and 
considered by the Court, the Court has exercised its discretion to treat State Farm's motion to 
dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At the close of the hearing, the Court granted judgment in favor of State Farm on the 
basis of State Farm's motion to dismiss, denied plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion 
to Dismiss, and denied plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The following facts are alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint, appear in the plaintiffs* 
insurance policy, or were admitted by plaintiffs: 
1. On August 5, 1994, plaintiffs Dee Voy and Marian Tucker were involved in an 
automobile accident with Maye Helen Potter. 
2. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs were insured under a State Farm automobile 
insurance policy. 
3. Plaintiffs' automobile insurance policy provided that State Farm would reimburse 
plaintiffs for the reasonable value of all necessary medical expenses incurred by plaintiffs up to 
$3,000.00 per person in connection with a covered accident. 
4. Plaintiffs alleged significant back and neck injuries resulting from this accident, for 
which they each sought medical treatment. 
5. Plaintiffs' medical providers performed various tests and treatments in the spring of 
1996 to alleviate plaintiffs' alleged injuries, thereby causing plaintiffs to incur medical expenses. 
6. Plaintiffs submitted their medical bills to State Farm for reimbursement. 
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7. Plaintiffs' insurance policy provided that an insured who made a claim against the 
policy would be required to undergo a medical examination by a physician chosen and retained 
by State Farm as often as State Farm reasonably required. 
8. Per plaintiffs' policy, State Farm required plaintiffs to undergo a medical examination 
by Dr. Stephen Marble to determine whether the claimed medical expenses were reasonable and 
necessary. 
9. On October 22, 1996, after examining the patients and reviewing their medical 
records, Dr. Marble concluded that Dee Voy Tucker's injuries arose from and were related to the 
automobile accident. With respect to Mr. Tucker's medical expenses, Dr. Marble stated that one 
set of x-rays was duplicative and therefore unnecessary. 
10. Dr. Marble concluded that Marian Tucker's injuries did not arise from the accident, 
and, instead, were related to a pre-existing condition. 
11. In November 1996, based upon Dr. Marble's conclusions, State Farm declined to 
reimburse plaintiffs for all of their claimed medical expenses. State Farm reimbursed plaintiffs 
only for those expenses deemed reasonable and necessary. 
12. Plaintiffs filed suit against Ms. Potter on July 23, 1998 for negligence. 
13. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on September 12, 2000 to include State Farm as a 
defendant. 
14. Plaintiffs alleged in their Amended Complaint that State Farm did not meet its 
obligation under Utah's personal injury protection statute (the "no fault" statute), see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 31A-22-307 to -309 (2000), to reimburse plaintiffs for their claimed medical expenses. 
15. In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs alleged that State Farm's retention of Dr. 
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Marble to conduct a medical examination, and State Farm's denial of coverage based upon the 
results of that examination, were unlawful Plaintiffs have asserted claims for declaratory 
judgment, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and 
fraud. 
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed 
to state claims for which relief may be granted, and that State Farm is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The Court's ruling is based on two independent grounds. First, plaintiffs have 
failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to conduct medical examinations to 
determine whether claimed medical expenses are reasonable and necessary. Second, plaintiffs' 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations governing insurance contract actions. Specifically, 
the Court concludes as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to limit or deny 
coverage of an insured based upon the findings of a medical examination by a physician retained 
by State Farm. 
(a) Each of plaintiffs' claims rests upon the incorrect assumption that it is 
unlawful under both Utah law and the plaintiffs' insurance policy for State Farm 
to retain a physician to conduct a medical examination of an insured, and to limit 
or deny coverage to an insured on the basis of that examination. 
(b) Utah's no-fault statute provides personal injury protection ("PEP") benefits 
to cover "the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical.. . services, 
not to exceed a total of$3,000 per person." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(a). 
Plaintiffs' insurance policy contains language to the same effect. Thus, under 
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Utah law and the parties' agreement, State Farm is obligated to reimburse 
plaintiffs only for those medical expenses that are reasonable, necessary, and 
related to a covered automobile accident. 
(c) It is neither improper nor unlawful for an insurer to conduct medical 
examinations and to limit or deny coverage to its insureds on the basis of those 
examinations. The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly condoned the use of such 
medical examinations to determine whether claimed medical expenses are 
reasonable and necessary. See Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co. et aL 973 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1998). Such examinations allow insurers to determine whether an insured's 
medical expenses are reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident. 
2. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations governing insurance 
contract actions. 
(a) Under Utah law, a party must bring an action based upon a contract of first 
party insurance within three years from the date of the inception of the loss. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (2000). The date of the inception of the loss is 
when the first loss is incurred. See Canadian Indemnity Co. v. K & T, Inc., 745 
F. Supp. 661, 664 (D. Utah 1990) (applying Utah law). In a case involving the 
alleged failure to pay PIP benefits, the first loss is incurred no later than the date 
on which the insurer refuses to pay the disputed PIP benefits. 
(b) Plaintiffs first incurred their alleged losses in 1996, when State Farm first 
declined to pay the disputed PIP benefits. Plaintiffs did not file suit against State 
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Farm until September 12, 2000, more than three years after the inception of the 
loss. 
(c) Each of plaintiffs' claims rests in contract, not in tort. See Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (holding that in a first 
party insurance relationship, the duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual, rather than fiduciary). All of plaintiffs' claims are based upon the 
insurance policy. None of the duties or obligations allegedly owed to plaintiffs by 
State Farm exists independently of the insurance policy. In addition, the "no 
fault" statute provides that a person entitled to PIP benefits may bring an action in 
contract to recover medical expenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(5)(d). 
The "no fault" statute does not provide means by which a plaintiff may sue the 
insurer in tort. 
3. As to each of plaintiffs' claims against State Farm, plaintiffs have failed to state a 
claim for which relief may be granted, and State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. Defendant State Farm's Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby granted; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied; 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby denied; and 
4. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
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5. Defendant State Farm is hereby awarded its costs of court incurred in connection 
with this action. 
6. The Court hereby certifies this judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 30, 2000, this Court ordered that plaintiffs' claims 
against defendant Maye Helen Potter be severed from plaintiffs' claims against State Farm, 
Farmers Insurance Exchange and Stephen P. Marble, M.D. The Court also ordered a separate 
trial to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims against Ms. Potter. Certification of this judgment is 
appropriate because there is no significant factual overlap between the claims asserted by 
plaintiffs against Ms. Potter, and those asserted by plaintiffs against State Farm. Plaintiffs' 
claims against Ms. Potter concern liability, whereas plaintiffs' claims against State Farm 
concern coverage. Thus, the outcome of any appeal of this judgment would not have a res 
judicata effect on plaintiffs' claims against Ms. Potter. See, e.g., Bennion v. Pennzoil Co. et al., 
826 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1992) (setting forth requirements for proper certification under Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) (citation omitted). 




-Counsel for Plaintiffs <2-Z-o/ 
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CLERK'S MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the {£? day of February, 2001,1 caused to be mailed, first-
class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR DISMISSAL to 
the following: 
Adrianne Goldsmith, Esq. 
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. 
Gateway Tower West, Suite 1200 
15 West South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Trent J. Waddoups, Esq. 
Can* & Waddoups 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Harold L. Petersen 
Petersen & Hansen 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
David A. Greenwood, Esq. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Kevin Simon 
Epperson & Rencher 
10W. 100 S. #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^r^iL^nj 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
HAMMOND DIVISION 
RUTH H A R E and WESLEY HARBL, 
Plaintiffs 
v. ) 2:98 CV6S 




Presently before the court is a motion filed by plaintiffs, husband and wife Ruth and 
Wesley Hste ("lie Hares"), on May 13, 2000, seeking to certify this action as a class action and to 
amend the compLaint to add an additional defendant In order to properly address the merits of 
that double-barreled motion, a detailed discussion of the history of this case is necessary. 
This action originated as separate actions tiled in state court in January 1998, one by Ruth 
Hare, and one by Wesley Hare. Each alleged that he/she had been involved in an automobile 
accident (the same accident) and that his/ber automobile insurer, defendant State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company (''State Farm"), had in bad faith rcfiised to pay medical benefits 
due under the policy of insurance and had committed fiaud by employing a third-party benefits 
review fixm solely for the propose of producing a false report which could be used as a 
justification for denying the medical benefits. 
On March 2,1998, State Farm removed the actions to this court On December 14,1998, 
Magistrate Judge Theresa L, Springmann conducted a staws conference where she consolidated 
the cases as one under the above cause number, ordered that all discovery be completed by June 
15,1999, and that any dispositive motions be filed by July 19,1999. 
On January 19, L999, State Farm filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment On 
February 2, 1999. the Hares moved for an extension of dme to respond, arguing that they needed 
substantial discovery in order to frame meir response. After a status conference held on 
March 16,1999, concerning that motion and a motion to compel discovery, Magistrate Judge 
Springmann panted the Hares' .request, giving them until August 20,1999, to respond to State 
Farm's motion for partial summary judgment. 
On August 11.1999, the Hares advised Magistrate Judge Springmarm that they needed to 
retain an expert to review discovery produced by State Farm and could not respond to the motion 
tor summary judgment until after reviewing that expat's report Magistrate Judge Springmann 
gave plamtiflS •until October 11,1999, to retain and make fell disclosure of the expert's opinion 
pursuant vo RULE 26 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE [docket entry 40]. 
On October 12,1999, the Hares sought a thirty-day extension to produce their expert 
report, and on October 28,1999, Magistrate Judge Springmarm gave them until 
November 29,1999, to do so. That deadline passed without the report being produced, and on 
December 20,1999, Magistrate Judge Springmann conducted another status conference where 
several new deadlines were set [docket entry 46], First, Magistrate Judge Springmann gave the 
Hares a new deadline of March 31,2000, for completing their discovery. Second, she mooted ax 
the pending motion for partial summary judgment, with leave for it to be reinstated after the Han 
<*ere able to eomplate the discovery necessary to formulate their response. Last, she gave the 
Hares a final (emphasis in original) extension until January 31.2000, to make their expert 
disclosures. 
2 
Discovery disputes, ongoing and being resolved by Magistrate Judge Spriagmann on a 
continuous baaia during the agents grrmrnflnzcd above, continued. On April 28,2000, Magistrate 
Judge Springmann conducted a final Status conference where she gave the Hares until 
June 12, 2000, to produce their expert reports, extended discovery at the Hares' 
request—agam—until September 29,2000, set a new dispositive motion deadline for 
November 1# 2000, and a trial date of April 9,2001. Magistrate Judge Springmann's minute cntiy 
following the conference warned that there would be kTSO FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF 
TIME OR CONTINUANCES on discovery, [or] filing and briefing of motions,«•* [docket entry 
61]. 
The Hares* next move, on May IS, 20OOy was the request under consideration in this order 
to certify this case as a class action and to amend their complaint to add a new defendant, the 
third-parry benefits review firm referenced la their original complaints. State Farm immediately 
objected to this request, characterizing it as an attempt to ftrther postpone resolution of its motion 
for partial summary judgment filed nearly a year and a half earlier and delay the trial date, and 
asked the court either to deny class certification or to postpone its decision on that issue until after 
deciding State Farm's; motion for partial summary judgment 
On November la 2000, State Farm renewed its motion for partial summary judgment by 
filing substantially die same motion as it had filed before. On December 1,2000. the 
Hares—finally—responded to that motion. That motion became fully-briefed an January 4f 2001 
[docket entty 82]. 
In their original complaints, (he Hares alleged that S^ atc Farm had employed a third-party 
benefits review firm to produce inaccurate and false reports to be used as a justification to deny 
3 
the Hares' medical expenses. In their motion seeking to certify the use as a class action, the1 
Hares allege that State Farm conspiredwith the firm involved, Medical Biomechanics, Inc. 
CBMTO TO produce false end inaccurate reports to defraud State Farm's insureds of medical 
benefits to which they were entitled The Hares allege thai through discovery they have reviewed 
101 other cases where State Farm utilized BMIf and in 9S% of those 101 cases BM1 recommended 
that medical benefits be denied.1 The Hares allege that the reports produced by BMI were 
essentially boilerplate reports, produced at State Farm's direction using stock phrases and reasons 
fox denial, rather than actual substantive reviews of the facts at issue in each individual case. The 
Hares seek to have certified as a class those policyholders referenced in at least 606 reports 
prepared by BMI for State Farm in Indiana, 
The requirements far maintaining a class action are set out in Fed, R. Civ, P. 23* First, 
plaintiff must establish that all four of the prerequisites of RULE 23(a) are met: (1) numerasity (the 
class must be so large * that joinder of all members is impracticable''): (2) commonality (there 
must exist "questions of law or fact caramon ta the class1'); (3) typicality (named panics* claims or 
defenses must be 'typical... of the class'1); and (4) adequacy of representation (the representative 
must be able to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class14)- KeeU v. Wader, 149 
F.3d 589,594 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v* Windsor, 521 U.S, S91, 613-14,117 
S-Ct 2231,2245, 138 L£d2d 689 (1997)); see FED- R Qv. P. 23(a). Then, plaintiff must show 
1
 In their motion to certify the class the Hares assert that this conspiracy was pled in their 
original complaints. The court accepts this as true, if the complaints are liberally read. 
* It bears pointing our thai the Hares argue that this high denial rate is itself evidence of 
fraud, k seems likdy, however, thai State Fann would only send ftr outside medfc^ review 
those cases which fr^tt™! claims adjusters believed questionable. This could account far the 
high denial ram. Thus, the denial rate itself has little or no evidentiary value. 
that thff action fits within one of the categories described by RUIB 23(b), which need not be 
summarized hern. 
Ordinarily the decision whether or not to certify a ease as a class action should be made 
prior to any ruling on the merits, jee Mira v. Nuclear Measurements Carp*t 107 F,3d 466,474 
(7th Cir< 1997), and based on an assumption thai the allegations made in support of certification 
are true -without consideration of the merits of the case. See Riordnn v. Smith Barney, 113 FJLD, 
60, 62 (NJDJ1L19S6). This, however, is not an ordinary case. The presumption that certification 
should be decided before any ruling on the merits is made springs from the language of 
FED JLCiv J . 23, which directs: 
As soon as practicable after the comtneucement of an action brought 
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to 
be so maintained, 
ITED,R.Clv.P. 23(cXl). In this case the request that the action be allowed to proceed as a class 
action was not even made until over two years after the original, uon-class-action complaints were 
filed, and more than fifteen months after plaintiffs had succeeded in delaying their response to a 
summary judgment motion addressed to the merits of those original complaints. 
Similarly, the notion that the decision whether an action may be maintained as a class 
action should be made without consideration of the merits of the case derives from the same RULE 
23 language arid, marc importantly, stems from a concern that die representative plaintiff not be 
allowed to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the requirements for it. S&* 
Eisen v« Carlisle & Jaequedin, 417 U.S.1S6, 177*78,94 S.Ct 2140,2152, 40 L-Ed2d 732 (1974). 
Here, the Hares have already had the benefit of over two years of discovery relevant to their class 
action allegations and, because the burden of demonstrating that the requirements for a class 
action ate met is always on the plaintiffs, it is impossible to consider their request in a vacuum: 
5 
the court Would expect the Hares1 motion for class certification to identify at least some evidence 
supporting their allegations of fraudulently-prepared, boilerplate reports. Cf. Stair K Equifax 
Check Scrvs., Inc., 181 F_3d 832, 835(7thCir-1999) ("Disputes about class certification cannot 
be divorced from the merits—indeed, one of the fundamental unanswered questions is whether 
judges should be influenced by their tentative viey/ of the merits when deciding whether to certify 
adassC-]11) 
Because substantial discovery has already taken place in this case, and enabled the Hares 
to respond to State Farm's motion for paitial summary judgment, there is ample material to review 
in considering whether there are question* of face common to the class, and whether the Hares9 
cfoims are typical of the class claims. On these points the court quotes the Hares1 arguments for 
certification in their entirety: 
In this case, the plaintiffs are alleging that the information relied 
upon by Medical Biomechanics when producing its reports were 
based upon inaccurate, deceptive, askewed [sic] and baseless 
information. The defendants may argue ibat each individual 
plaintiff had their own unique medical situation, however, the 
Information relied upon [by] State Farm and Medical 
Biomechanics is common throughout its reports. As a result, 
there are common issues of fact throughout the class. 
. , * The plaintiffs arc asserting as outlined above that Stace Farm. 
and Medical Biomechanics conspired together to defend them our 
of medical payments due ihem under their policy of insurance with 
State Farm. Ihis is the same claim which is being made by the class 
m this instance, AS a result, die Court should find that the claims of 
Ruth and Wesley Hare are typical of the claims vducb ^ill be 
presented by members a£ the class. 
Plaintiffi* Motion to Certify Class Action at 8-9 (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is clear thai without any evidence suggestive of ^ oilctplacc^-type reports, the 
Hares cannot satisfy the second and third threshold requirements of a class action, that is, that 
6 
there are questions of fact common to the class and thai the class representatives' claims are 
typical of the class claims. Put another way, if each medical report prepared by BMI is unique to 
foe particular facts of the accident involved, instead of a boilerplate report produced from stock 
phrases, then the accuracy of every one of the 606 reports the Hares sec as proxies for the plaintiff 
class would have to be individually analyzed. This is precisely the opposite of the scenario 
envisioned by the Tecpiiremcnt that there be questions of fact common to the class. Rather than 
showing that their claim would be typical of common feet questions, the Hares" filings in support 
of their request for class certification indicate the necessity of this type of mdmdualized review. 
For example, in their fisst supplemental filing [docket entry 66] the Hares argue mat the 
report of their Expert, Dr. Owdea Turner, shows that the BMI report at iisue in this case was 
incomplete because it ignored the most significant biomechanical forces that occurred daring the 
Hares" accident, misrepresented certain data from the medical literatare and ignored ether telecast 
literature not supportive of BMP* findings, and used data that was "largely irrelevant" to the facts 
of the accident, an of which "fell in line wrth State Farm's previous practices" as "outlined 
numerous times to the Court" Plaintiffs' Supplemental Support at 2. The reference to State 
Faun's "prior history" relates to the Hares' effort to convince the court, using newspaper articles 
regarding state mvesdgations of State Farm's claims practices and two other lawsuits against State 
Farm (which arc approximately tan years old and do not involve BMD that State Farm must be 
engaging in fraudulent behavior in the present case. 
Those efforts are misplaced. The relevant facts are the facts at issue in tins case and the 
court views Dr. Turner's report (attached to m b t i f t ' supplemental filing) as indieativc of why 
the possible claim of each potential member of the class would rest on unique, rather than 
common, questions offset Dr. Turner found BMTs report "mcomplete" because it focused on 
the forces caused by the side-swiping impact between the Hares' auto and the truck involved in 
the accident, radicr than the forces occurring after the Hates' auto left the road, which Dr. Turner 
believed to be the more rignificaot forces itrvolvei Dr. Hare found BMTs use of studies and data 
from the literature misreprcscntarivc and "largely irrelevant" because BMI extrapolated from daca 
derived from staged low-speed, tear-end crashes which, in Dr* Turners opinion, bear little 
resemblance to real-world accidents. 
Although Dr. Turner's opinion may be correct, bis critique of BMTs report; and the Hares' 
reliance on that critique to prove State Farm and EMl's "fiwdulenT behavior, shows two things 
critical to the class certification issue. First, that although the methodology end science used in 
formulating its report may have been faulty, BMI did cruder the individual circumstances of the 
Hares* accident rather than simply producing a "canned^ report.3 Second, that flic any ''fraud" or 
4ftfelsityw in BMTs report can only be demonstrated by individualized expert analysis of the report 
itself. Dr. Turner admitted this in his deposition, in the following question and answer: 
Q: You would ^gree with me, wouldn't you, Doctor, that it would 
take some specialised training not unlike your specialized training in 
order to discern even die reports from Medical Biomechanics, Inc., 
the complaints that you have about those reports, the deficiencies 
that tfaey have in your view, is that ligjit? 
A: Yes, that** correct 
Deposition of Charles Turner at 32 (Ex- X to Plaintifis' Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment). 
3
 In conjunction with, the pending motion for summary judgment the couit has read BMTs 
report and ii contains a detailed discussion of the circumstances of the aeddent, the Hares' 
complaints, and medical trcamient received by die Hares. 
8 
In shaft, rather than showing that there is a class of potential plaintiffs with claims thai rest 
on common facts, the Haras have shown that each of the at least 606 possible claims would 
rebuke searching expert review of individualized Sets. This is not fodder for a class action. 
In coigunctioii^iih their request to certify this action as a class action, the Hares haw also 
moved to amend their complaint to addBMI as a drfendant. Although leave to mv—H a 
complaint should be freely gcauted whan justice requires, see FED. It CIV. P. 15(a), the only 
justification offered by die Hares for their request is diet the addition of BMI is necessary if this 
action is to be maintained^ a class action- As the court has determined that fibe action win not be 
ccriSed as a class action, BMTs presence is unnecessary. In nacbing this conclusion, the court is 
also mindful of the fact that in requesting leave to amend; the Hares assert thai in £mr original 
complaint they alleged the existence of a conspiracy between State Farm and BML The Hares 
have offered no explanation for then waiting nearly two and ahalf years to addBMI as a named 
defendant 
For the foregoing reasons, the Hares' motions to certify class action and amend complaint 
to add an additional defendant (docket entries 63-1, 63-2) are both DENIED; State Farm's 
motions to postpone class certification (docket entry 64) and to strike plaintiffs1 supplement is. 
support of claas certification (docket entry 70) are both DENIED as moot. 
SO ORDERED. 
ENTER: March 2tf, 2001 
' -CUJL. <fW I %J\* KfKJUi 
05/22/2001 13:39 FAX 202 263 3300 MB&P WASH DC 
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OPINION 
PlaintLSs Herbert Ostnof and LaCountess B- Corbitt, on behalf of themselves and 
oti&xs similarly situated, have filed soil against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
As insureds under automobile insurance policies of State Fan**, they allege that, pursuant to an 
illegal plan of State Farm, tfaey were denied reimbursement for medical bills and lost income tinder 
the personal injury protection (PIP) provision of the policies. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Class 
Certification, State Farm has filed a Modem to Disqualify Ostrof as Putative Class Representative, 
and Plaintiff have filed a Motion to Add Class Representatives. 
The Court will DENYPlainttfiS' Motionfcr Class C&tfficatiojt, which MOOTS State 
Farm's Motion to Disqualify Ostrof and Plaintiffs' Motion to Add Class Representatives. 
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Section § 19-505 of the Insurance Article of the Mmyland Code requires thai any 
motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold or delivered ill Maryland must contain, unless 
waived, coverage for medical, hospital and disability benefits, includinglost income. This coverage 
is commonly known as personal injury protection (HP) coverage. PIP coverage provides for the 
payment of all reasonable and necesssuy medical expenses and 85% of tost income which arise out 
of an accident involving the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle and 'which are incurred "within 
3 years after the accident or incident, The coverage applies regardless of whether the insured was 
at feult in causing the accident giving rise to the medical expenses and lost income. The purpose of 
the coverage is to permit the speedy recovery of monies without the delays of tort litigation and to 
permit an injured individual to recover without regard to firahL 
Plaiotiflfe allege that they, as well as members of their class, either purchased PIP 
coverage from State Farm as part of their own motor vehicle liability insurance contract were 
covered under a State Farm policy which contained PIP coverage; that they and their class were 
involved in.an accident during the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle and incurred reasonable 
and necessary medical expenses and/or lost income as a result of injuries sustained in the accident 
or incident; and that they and their class timely submitted claims to State Farm for PEP benefits under 
the aforesaid contracts which State Farm "wrongfully denied in whole or part 
Plaintiffs contend that State Farm deliberately engaged in a course of deceptive 
conduct as to them and each member of their class. Stale Farm, ttiey say, urged them to accept PIP 
coverage, suggesting it would evaluate PEP claims fairly objectively, thoroughly, ptomptly and in 
accordance with Maryland law. but at the same time concealed from them the existence of a 
2 
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"caramon end fraudulent plan, scheme or practice" that made each of those representations false. 
Among State Farm's allegedly deceptive and unfeirpracticcswerc(l)theuseof compiiterprograms 
•with databases that arbitrarily determined that the bills of Plaintiffe and the class exceeded 
hypodietical amounts charged by hypothetical providers in hypothetical geographical regions; (2) 
the engagement of consultants who consistently submitted reports resulting in a denial of benefits 
to Plaintiffs and the class; and (3) bo the extent that State Farm occasionally required Plaintiffe or 
members of the class to submit to medical examinations, the engagement of physicians who 
routindy provided reports whir h State F and 
the class's medical bills. In ail these instances, Stale Farm was allegedly aware of the inadequacy 
and lack of objectivity of its investigation and review of the PIP claims. 
As of October 13, 1998, Plaintiff Herbert Ostrof had a motor vehicle liability 
insurance contract with Stare Farm Which included PIP coverage hi the amount of $2,500,00. On 
that date he was iqjutcd in a motor vehicle accident, incurring medical bills in consequence. He 
alleges that he submitted his claims for PEP benefits to State Faun in timely feshion but that State 
Farm refused to pay at least $87.00 of medical bills due to certain of his health care providers. 
As of May 26,1996, Plaintiff LaCountess B. Carbitt's father had a PIP policy with 
State Faun in the amount of $10,000.00- On that dale she was injured in a motor vehicle accident, 
incurring medical bills in caring for her uyuries as welt as losing income as a result. Corbitt alleges 
that after timely submitting her claim for PIP benefits, State Farm refused to pay her medical bills 
and lost income benefits totaling at least $5,984.00, 
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All individuals who were injured in an acrodentari^ 
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, who (a) 
timely and properly submitted in accordance with State Farm's 
insurance policies and/or Maryland law, a claim for personal injury 
protection and/or medical payments benefits to Defendant State Farm, 
under a motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by State Farm 
and governed by Maryland law, which claim was denjpd» in whole or 
part on or after August 18,1996, based on use of jajmputerized fee 
review schedule? or medical record reviews (conducted by 
consultants retained and paid by State FarmX and who (b) received or 
were tendered an amount of benefits which was lesa than the stated 
PIP policy limits and the amount claimed. ! 
They also ask for certification of a subclass: 
"Allindividuals encompassed in the 'post-policy purchase loss' class, 
who also, from August IS, 1996 to tiie date of final judgment* 
purchased a Stale Farm automobile insurance policy which contained 
HP coverage and which was governed by Maiyland law/* 
Plaintiflfe proceed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 2 
i 
This is the class as defined by Plaintiffs in their Reply to Defendant's Opposition to 
their Motion for Class Certification. The class proposed in the Plaintif&a Complaint, however, is 
far broader and includes any individual who submitted a claim for PIP benefits to State Farm, 
governed by Maryland law, whose claim was denied in whole or part after August 18s 1989. After 
State Farm pointed out in its Opposition to the Motion that the proposed class might include 
claimants whose claims were barred by limitations, or who were never in an accident or were not 
injured at all, or whose policies had expired or who bad failed to submit PIP applications or other 
required documentation on a timely basis, Pl&intxfis redefined the class in their Reply. 
The Court notes that amendments to complaints ordinarily are not accomplished by a party *s mere 
declaration to that effect in the course of a reply brief and thai the proper vehicle for effecting such 
an amendment is by means of an amended complaint. See FedL R. Civ. P. 15(a); Local Rule 103.6. 
However, inasmuch as the Court is denying class certification in any case, as a matter of judicial 
economy it will assume that Hie Complaint, has been appropriately amended. 
2 
The Complaint, originally filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and 
removed to this Court* actually seeks certification pursuant to Maryland Rule of Procedure 2-231 * 
Since the Maryland rule is in pari materia with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and since the 
4 
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A) All class actions in federal court must satisfy the following conditions of Fed. 
R. Civ. P, 23(a): 
1) Nnmerosity: Tbc claim muse, be so numerous that joinder of all individual 
members is "impracticable (23(a)(1)); 
2) Commonality; There must be questions of law and feet coxnmon to the class 
(23(a)(2)); 
3) Typicality: The claims crffoe class reptwemtati^ 
of the claiss (23(a)(3)); and 
4) Adequacy of JRenresentatioii: The proposed class representatives must be able 
to fairly and adequately proiect the interests of the class members (23(a)(4)). 
Inaddition to meeting the requirements of Rcle 23(a)* aproposed class representative 
must meet one of die several grounds for maintaining the cause of action set out in Fed, &. Civ, P, 
23(b), Ostrof and Corbitt have opted to proceed principally under 23(b)(3), wfaichxequircs that they 
demonstrate that questions of law or fact common to the class "predominate" over questions 
effecting die individual members and that, on balance, a class action would be "superior" to other 
methods available for adjudicating the controversy.3 
parties have argued the case in terms of the federal rule, tbe Court's analysis will proceed on the 
basis of the federal rule* 
a 
Plaintiffs also argue, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P, 23(bXl)(A), that there is a risk of 
prejudice from separate actions establisldng incompatible standards of conduct for State Farm and 
that adjudications with respect to individual members of the class might be dispositive of the 
interests of other members not parties to these adjudications. Plaintiffs, however, do not appear to 
press this argument with particular vigor and fcrgDodzeason. As State Farm points out, the present 
0 0 1 5 
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B) Ostrof and Corbitt maintain that they satisfy &U Rule 23's prerequisites. 
Ad for numerosity, they allege a class of "hundreds if not thousands11' of State Faun 
insureds who applied for PIP benefits under insurance policies issued by State Farm, the joinder of 
whose individual lawsuits would be difficult and inconvenient 
As for commonality, they cite the "common course of deceptive conduct37 on the part 
of State Farm as well as several characteristics they say they share with the proposed class, namely 
(a) PIP contracts and coverage; (b) the occurrence of accidents or incidents; (c) timely submission 
erf claims; (d) the firilure of Stan? Farm i4> undertake an objective review of their claims, and the 
arbitrary denial or reduction of those claims baaed on computer analyses; sad (e) fraudulent 
representations by State Farm that claims would be paid regardless of fault based on an objective 
review in compliance with law, together with concealment of this common scheme or plan to 
wrongfully deny or reduce the PIP claims. Additional common questions of law are said to pertain 
to the nature and extent of a fiduciary duty State Fann purportedly owed to Plaintiffs under Maryland 
law to process PIP claims Surly, promptly, and in accordance with law. 
As for the typicality of their claims. Plaintiffs argue thax they share the common 
characteristics of the class. Again, they, as well as others, are PIP insureds with State Farm, were 
suit seeks only money damages, whereas the general practice is to certify aRule 23(b)(1) (A) action 
only in cases seeking injunctive or declaratory i*Jie£ See, e,g„ Jh Re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig^ 
829FJ2d 1539,1544 (11th Cir. 1987), Because only money damages are sought, the Court sees no 
risk that Staxe Farm will be subject to inconsistent standards of conduct such as might affect, for 
example, a party maintaining an alleged nuisance who is subject to individual litigations of several 
riparian owners. See Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 1996 Amendment 
Subdivision (b)(1) Clause (A), The only possibility is that State Farm might be found liable in this 
case and not in another (or Vice versa). However, the later judgment would not be incompatible with 
the earlier judgment because, by paying the earlier (or later) judgment, State Farm could act 
compatibly with both. See Zimmerman v. Be//, 800 F.2d 386,389 (4th Cir, 1986). 
6 
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injured in accidents or incidents, submitted timely claims, and were denied payments based on cfae 
same wrongful course of conduct by State Fann, ie. its "practice of arbitrarily reducing or denying 
PIP claims by using computet programs and hired-gun consultants." 
As for the adequacy of representation, counsel for Plaintiffs assume there is no 
challenge to their own qualifications to serve as class counsel and focus instead on the adequacy of 
the proposed class representatives, that is, on the mutuality of their interests and those of the 
proposed class members. Because of their "common and obvious interest," Plaintiffs submit that 
ttey will actively seek vindication of the class members' rights They ? insert that their interests a*e 
not antagonistic to those of the class because their interests axe held in common, because they have 
no conflict of interest ("Defendant,'' say Plaintiffs, "cannot produce my evidence showing aconflict 
of interest** on their part), because they suffer from no incapacity, and because there are no defenses 
unique or personal to them. 
Plaintiffs also argue that their case satisfies both the predominance and superiority 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), the former by reason of the "overriding common liability issues in 
this case," the latter primarily because of the relatively easy manageability of the proceeding. 
C) Sta^ Fan» opposes Plaintiff d l e ^ 
there is a commonality oflaw or i^^ 
of the putative class representatives are typical of those of the proposed members, or that the putative 
representatives can adequately represent the class. As far as FedL R. Civ, P. 23(bX3) is concerned, 
Stars Farm denies that common issues predominate or that, on balance* class certification would be 
superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, 
7 
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Above all, State Farm denies thai it has engaged in a common scheme of deception 
relative to the processing ofFlP claims. While it concedesihal PIP msweds in Maryland are entitled 
to recover reasonable expenses for necessary treafaneat of arcident-reiaied injuries, it argues that in 
practice a significant number of such claimants seek reimbursement for fees that are either not 
accident-related oar, if they are, that are not necessary or reasonable. Accordingly, State Farm 
believes that Mmeaa entitles itlo employ a variety of measures to verify those claims, an effort they 
contend that aefc^^ Among the methods State 
Fazm has used in this g^ard axe individualized review of claims by a claims representative (and 
sometimes by a clam 3 supervisor), followed by computer reviews, utilization reviews, and/or 
medical examinations, all designed to check the claimed costs against usual and customary costs for 
the claimed costs in the locality where lite service is rendered. Computer reviews involve the use 
of a database which compiles information regarding fees provided for a wide array of services in a 
partiaalargeogrsphic area. By comparing a proposed charge with the customary charge for the same 
service in the given area as established by the database, State Farm contends it is able to determine 
how die charge measures up. If, under all the circumstances, the charge is deemed unreasonable, 
reimbursement for the PIP claim is denied. During the time that State Farm used the computerized 
review method in Maryland, * its computer program Sagged any charges above the 35th percentile 
State Farm indicates that it stopped using computer fee review programs In March 
2000 for reasons unrelated to the filing of this lawsuit. It concedes, however* that shotdy after, in 
April 2000, the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) issued a bulletin addressing the issue of 
computer fee review programs. In it, the MIA stated that insurance companies ought not to rely on 
such programs as the solemethod ofassessing the reasonableness of fees bur pointed out that uin and 
of itself, * * * it is not unlawful &r a PIP insurer to apply and utiii2e a fee review schedule3' 
generated by computer programs. State Farm contends that it has never relied solely <m computer 
fee reviews to determine whether the charges are reasonable but has used it simply as one of several 
a 
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of charges for the same service In the particular area where it was rendered and then — subject to 
giving the requesting health caie provider an opportunity to justify the higher fee — conditionally 
reduced the fee to Ac maximum customary charge, UtilizaUoni^vicr^ (presumably what Plamuffs 
mea» by "medical records reviews") consist of reviews by a firm or firms of medical professionals 
with past experience in the evaluation of personal injury claims- In conducting their reviews, the 
reviewers consider the medical propriety of prescrib^l treatment as a cross-check against possibly 
unnecessary services by fee-for-service health caie providers. Medical examinations by private 
practice physicians are conducted to verify the insureds physical condition, the causal relationship 
between automobile accidents and injuries* and the propriety of the prescribed treatment. Rejecting 
the characterisation of these methods as part of a deceptive course of conduct, State Farm defends 
them as wholly appropriate means to prevent unreasonable claims, whether fraudulent or merely 
unnecessary or excessive. 
State Farm also challenges the proposition that the putative class shares any 
commonality of facts in regard to their HP claims. Each claimant's situation, State Farm argues, is 
unique and would require individualized proof of an erroneous coverage determination as well as 
proof of actual injury resulting from that detJaooatoatioiL Thus, Stale Farm suggests that at a 
minimum each claimant would have to prove that: 
• he or she was covered under a State Farm HP policy; 
• he or she was involved in a covered accident that resulted, in bodily injury 
and/or lost wages; 
• the treatment received for any injury "was ^necessary11; 
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the charges for necessary treatment were "teasoflablc"; 
• the claimant adequately documented his or her claim and complied with 
reasonable requests for medical examinations; 
State Farm denied coverage for all or part of ftatnecessary treatment or paid 
less than those reasonable charges; 
» the amount of the bill submitted by the claimant was within policy limits; and 
- the daimant suffered damage from Stele Farm's incorrect coverage decision, 
La. he or she was actually required to pay the rejected bills,5 
Additionally, insofar as Plaintiffs and the proposed class aj^ s propot&idiag a theory 
of recovery sounding in feaud, State Farm argues that each daimant would have to show that he or 
she reasonably relied upon a knowing misrepresentation by State Farm about the extent of its PIP 
coverage. 
Furthermore, based on the damages Plaintiffi have claimed in their pleadings, 
inherently individualized inquiries pertaining to damages would have to include; 
* Whether the individual claimant inclined "additional losses and damages in 
pursuit o f PIP damages; 
• Whether the individual claimant suffer "consequential damages" due to 
"emotional stress, concern, and worry;11 and 
Whether the individual claimant is entitled to punitive damages. 
A claimant would still be entitled to PIP benefits even ifhe or she had also recovered 
collateral medical or hospital benefits. Pmaa v. S t a t e s ^ fti* ^n12001 WL 350239 (Md. 2001). 
Bui the Couzt understands State Farm to be referring to cases in which no one would have paid the 
bill; the health care provider would simply have withdrawn any claim to die questioned amount. 
1 0 
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State Farm continues: Assuming tturt the proposed class shan^ a commoa first set 
of issues, individualized hearings on each class member's claims would still be required. Far 
example, to the extent that a claimant might be seeking reimbursement for multiple injuries that 
occurred close in time (e.£ Proposed Class Plaintiff Corbitt was in two accidents within S days7 
time), the claimant would have to demonstrate that a distinct accident caused a distinct injury 
entitling the claimant to a distinct quantum of medical treatment and distinct payment. It would also 
be necessary to know whether the clamant submitted a cbdm that was in fiact underpaid and, if so, 
whether the claimant was himself or herself subject to a claim for payment by the health care 
provider. Further, assuming State Farm owed the class a fiduciary duty to process claims fisiirly and 
promptly, it would be necessary to determine on an individualized basis whether that duty was 
breached by the particular method used and whether 1he breach resulted m If 
the utilization review method caused the breach, for example, the trier of fact would have to 
determine whether the physician who reviewed the claimant's file acted properly and whether the 
allegedly improper review actually caused a claimant to receive less compensation than he or she 
should have received- Even assuming the existence of a common scheme to wrongfully deny or 
reduce claims, each individual claimant would still have to prove that in his cxr her own case the 
claim was m feet wrongfully denied or reduced. 
State Farm also contends that the proposed Class Plaintiffs have felled to prove chat 
their claims and defenses are typical or that they would fairly and adequately represent the class* 
Ostrof; who is the subject of a separate motion to disqualify, has apparently never had to pay his 
health care providers the amount he was denied. Hius State Farm indicates that it paid a total of 
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reimbursements for medical expenses were reduced, and then by a total of only 587,24. This came 
after a review of Ostrof s claims flic, including bis medical records and billing information, and a 
comparison of the expenses with a medical icsemch database reporting tte prevailing Jfeea for the 
claimed services intheixslcvaiiteeogTaphici^gicm. SiateFami, moreover, notified Ostrvf a medical 
providers in writing of the adjustments it proposed to their bills and explained the rationale it had 
used to determine the appropriate amounts;, advising that if the providers disagreed with the 
adjustment, they should submit additional documentation- Since the providers submitted no such 
documentation aor did they sue Ostrof for their fees, Stale Farm claims he has suffered no damages 
and thus lacks standing to make a claim. 
As for proposed Class Plaintiff Corbitt, State Farms argues chat it also has defenses 
unique to her that would be a i ^ 
It points out, for example, that Corbftt was involved in an automobile accident S days prior to the 
accident for Which She seeks recovery here, making ft uncertain which accident caused which injury 
State Farm also notes Cnrbitt's deposition Testimony which reveals thai she may have obtained a 
double recovery for lost wages for the period of May 25 to June 8* 1996, which would subject her 
ta a unique defence of unclean hands. It suffiests that thro is a considerable!^ 
physical therapist may have suhmitted duplicative bills seeking for double payment for the same 
treatment applied to Corbitt following her two accidents. Further, since Corbitr submitted a PIP 
claim under her father's insurance policy, she is an improbable designee to assert on her own, muck 
less on bcball of others, any breach of contract or fraud claim. 
Stale Farm suggests that balhC^ 
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ComplaintinthiflauiL Cocfaitt could pot recall who may have made representations to her or when 
they might have been ffiade. Both wens uncertain asto what damages they were claiming. When 
asked whether she had filed tax returns fori 996, pirauraably a relevant inqtriiyinastnijchasttielost 
wage claims she aenks in this case occun«d in that year, Corbitt asserted a privilege under the Fifth 
Amendment and refused, to answer-
Finally, assuming Plaintife have mot each of Rule 23(a)*s requirement^ including 
that of commonality, Slate Farm disputes that they can sntisfy Rule 23(b)(3)*a requirements that 
common issues '"predominate" and that class certification be "^winr* to other methods for the feir 
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. While it well may he efficient to eliminate the 
requirement that members of the Plaintiff Class adduce evidence in support of each element of their 
claims, State Farm says the consequence would be to deprive it of the opportunity to present 
individualized evidence and raise individualized defenses. Any economy of time, effort and expense 
achieved by proceeding as class action in this case, would necessarily sacrifice procedural fairness 
in derogation of State Farrrr s due process rights. Finally, State Farm submits the proposed Class 
Plaintiffs have failed td present wiarfcable plan formanaging this case, belying any assertion that this 
^wdd be a relatively easy case to manage, 
IIL 
It is *^vell settled in the Fourth C ^ 
burden of establishing the right to such certification under Rule 23." Bostron v„ Ajrfkl, 182 F JUX 
188, 192, CL6 (D.Md. 1998). There is no presumption in favor of such certification as ""Would 




_ 0 7 / 2 5 / p l _llL28_FAX 309_Z£SJ422„ STATE FARM CORP LAW E8 
15/22/2001 13:29 FAX 202 263 3300 MB&P WASH DC 
and impose it on the defendant or defendauter Windham v* American Brands Inc.»565 F.2d 59,65, 
iu6 (4th Cir. 1997} (*» **wc>. Set also In Re AM Rabbins Co., 880 F^d 709, 728 (40L Or. 1989) 
(abrogated on other grounds by Amchem Prods. Inc. v- Windsor, 521 US . 591 (1997). 
Plaintiffs, therefore, have the burden of establishing the four elements of Rule 23(a) 
-raniuerositya commonality, typicality and adequacy of copccscuCacioxL. See, £.#,, Amcftem, 521 U jS. 
at 613-14. The Court considers these elements first SeeG*n. Tel Co. v. Falcon* 457 U.S, 147.161 
(1982). Only if Plaintiffs caa establish these is the Court obliged to consider the requirements of 
Rude 23(b)- Amchem, 521 tLS. at 614. 
A) Numerosity is not contested by State Form and the Court will take it as 
established. 
B) As for commonality, the Fourth Circuit has held ^cextificarton is proper only 
when a detemriiiatrve critical issue overshadows all other issues/" Stottv. Hav»arth% 916 F 2^d 134, 
145 (4th CIr. 1990). "[QJuestion[s] [that are] in no vray dispositive and [which] simply p&opel the 
action into a posture where judicial scrutiny is necessary for just adjudication73 are not sufficient 
under Rule 23(aX2), 14,916 F,2d at 145. 'The disparate nature ofthe Jproposed class member's] 
claims precludes class treatment" Braussardv. Meir&ke Disc Muffler Shops Inc., 155 F3d 331, 
344(4xhCir.l998)- See also Peoples v. J T a ^ v ^ ^ u * ^ ^ 
O* representative plaintiff cannot establish commonality under [Rule 23(a)(2)] if t i c coltti must 
investigate ea*& plaintiffs individual claim.") 
As set forth in their Reply to State Farads Opposition to the Motion to Certify, 
Plaintiffs propose what they take to be a simple scheme for the trial of this case: 
If a jury finds thai it is wrong to reduce claims [based on computer 
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that poise is how many claims in the relevant time period weire in fici 
reduced on these bases, and whattbe amounts of xhe reductions "were, 
Then, ifDefcndant cannot produce any additional evidence, obtained 
prior to the decision to deny benefits, which supports these 
reductions i ^ i n aider to mea 
presumptive reasonableness and necessity of each FTP claim, - then 
Defendant will simply have to pay whatever the amount of the 
rcduction^vuoncachclaint At thai point, having been found to fall 
short, at the time of its claim decision, of meeting its burden to rebut 
the presumptive reasonableness and necessity of each relevant PIP 
claim, Defendant will not be able to reopen each case and conduct 
fbfl blown individual rnim-trials cm the issue of reasonableness and 
necessity* (Emphams in original; fewxbaote omitted) 
But, as State Femm emphasiws over a ^ 
insurer pay up to tfac limits of the insureds policy "the reasonable and necessary expenses [for 
specified medical services] thai ansa from a motor vehicle accident and that are incurred within 3 
years after the accident," Maryland Code Annotated [Insurance], § 19-5QS(bX2)C0, **"* **8S% o f 
income lost? BS a result of such, accident* IdL+ Section 19-505(b)(2)(ii)- Merely to recite the terms 
of the stature, in the Court's view, is to demonstrate which side has ihe better part of this argument. 
Quite simply, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion urged by State Farm that the case is rife wtth 
individu3li2fidmquirie3, Fundamejatxd question?nece&sar^^ Was 
there in fact an accident? Was the claimant injured? Was the event adequately documented? Was 
review of the claim based on computer review alone? Utilization review alone? Medical review 
alone? On some combination of these? Did the claimant Imve a pre-existing medical condition? 
Was The treatment pxescribed&r the claimant necessary? Was it excessive? Were the health care 
provider's bills reasonable? Was there duplication in billing? Was fraud iavolved? Did the 
individual claimant actually hafve tn pay tkg ammmf ferte F^Ti fVmfrd? Has the claimant been sued 
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[pgiTirf^ g relevant. The Court is unable to find in this case the commonality that Rule 23(a)(2) 
demands before a class can be certified* 
Wetc that not enough^ Proposed 0 
are typical of the proposed class. Generally speaking, typicality involves consideration of the 
similarity between proposed class pJainiifis* legal and remedial thrones and those of the persons 
they pmport to represent Lighibournv. County of El Paso, r^,118F3d421,426(5thGhr.l997). 
Ttedassrepwssentafivc^ustbop 
injniyafi the class membeiB.^ Gen. Tet. Co,. 457UJS. at 156 (1982), Accordingly, the party s^sking 
to represent the class must be able to prove actual injury to him or herself, as opposed to other 
members of the class. O "Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 48S> 494 (1974). Although it is not necessary 
that all class members suffer die same injury as the class representatives, see, e.g., Rosario v. 
Livadttls* 963 F-2d 1013,1018 (7th Cir, 1992% where a purported class Representative is subject to 
a unique defense that cannot be asserted against other members of the class (other than, minor 
discrepancies), typicality may be lacking. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. V- Merrill Lynch Pierce, 
Fanner & Smith, jfoc, 903 ¥Jd 176, 180 C2nd Cir. 1990). 
The Conrc has alieady referred to proposed Class Plaintiff Ostrof s situation. He, it 
appears, is either not a member of the proposed class may be subject to a unique defense. It i5 
uncontested that he has never had to pay his health care providers the amounts that were dnniedhim. 
No suits for the fees are pending against him nor, apparently, are any such suits imminent. See 
McGffl v. Rare Farm Mut Aula Ins. Co., 526 N.W.Zd \2y 14 (Mich, Ct. App. 1994)(finding 
proposed class plaintiffs claims atypical: "[There is] no evidence that PlaintiiEs have suffered 
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p^frr<^ tupiqi^ *r» PMptiff rvirKitt have also been noted. Since she was involved 
ia two automobile ai»e«frf«fttg only cdght days apart, she would seed to prove which accident or 
inadent gave ri» to what quantum of injury. Furthermore, at least golorably, it appears that she may 
have submitted duplicate bills to Stare Farm asking for payment fijr a single treatment tendered in 
conseqeenceofthe two accidrats and possibly collected 
since her PIP claim was submitted under her fifllxeff^iosuiance policy, it is dear that she could not 
assert a breach of contract claim nor eeuld she have been the victim of any fraudulent 
misrepresentation regarding the extent of Stale Farm's PIP coverage- * 
The final prerequisite under Rule 23(a) is that the persona representing the proposed 
class must be able "fairly and adequately to protect the interests" of all members of the class. 
Representation £s deemed "adequate"* if the attorneys representing tbe class are qualified and 
competent, see In Re Agent Orange Prod Liab.Litig„m S00F2d 14, l8(2udCir. 1986), and the class 
representatives are not disqualified by reason of interests antagonistic to the rest of the class. See 
lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pfcvures> Inc., SS2 F,2d 507, 512 (9fli Cix. 1978). 
Presumably in recognition of the fragility of their claims to be certified as class 
representatives^ Plaintiffs at oral argument handed up a motion stmkftng to add four new class 
representatives, all described as individuals who would vigorously pursue the action in the interest 
of The class. Whether or not a motion to add olass repress 
yet come into existence, see, &g_, Dietrich v. Bauer, 76F.Supp.2d312T 326 (S J3.N.Y, 1999X Stale 
Faixa argues persuasively tha 
undue delay, even if typicality and the adequacy of the current PlamtiEfe to serve as Class Plaintifis 
wer« the Court's only concerns. As with Plaintiff Ostrof and Corbitt, State Faun would also be 
eotrttfid to determine whether the claims of the parties proposed to be added would be typical of the 
class and whether they would be adequate representatives. Discovery, however, has closed, briefs 
have been filed, and the case has been argued. Adding further named plaintiffs at this time would 
therefore clearly be prejudicial to State Faun. See In Re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liab. 
Lttig., 163 F JLD 258,260 (RIX Tax. 1995) ("die addition of [more] plamtifis at this late date would 
unfiririy prejudice the defendants."). 
1 7 
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Since State Faun raises no challenge to the qualifications and competency of 
proposed class counsel, the Court need not address that matter. 
As for tbe proposed class representatives, courts have disagreed over whether 
knowledge on Ihrir part or lack of same is relevant in deterznixung the adequacy of their 
representation of class interests. Compare Linder v. Litton Sys. Inc.* 81 FJLD, 14, 20-22 (DMd. 
1978) (plaintiff deemed inadequate class representative because he knew nothing about the policies 
and practice he was challenging in the lawsuit), -with Grace v. Perception Tsek. Corp.t 128 FJLD, 
16i> 170 (D-Mass. ] 9S9) (class representatives7 memory lapses at deposidoa did oot render them 
inadequate). At best, Plaintiffs* clwins of adequacy in this case begin less than au>#ieiously. Both 
have displayed limited knowledge and understanding of this lawsuit. Ostrof could not remember 
tending the Complaiat, nor which of his bills in question had been paid in full or part. Corbitt did 
notknow how mnchmoney she was claiming for lost wages, -which injury she was being treated for, 
or what medication she was taking. 
But apart from that, there is an overlap between the requirement of adequacy of 
iepwentation and the requirement of typicality. Gen. Tel Co., 457 U.S- at 157. As to both 
requirements, if the proposed class representative's claim is subject to a unique defense, the court 
may refuse to certify as class representative a plaintiff subject to that defense. See Hanoa v. 
Dataproducts Corp., 976 F-2d 497, 508 (Mi Cir. 1992). Since O^trot as previously noted, would 
be subject to the defense ttat he l ^ 
Fann and since Corbitt would be subject to distinguishing between the consequences of overlapping 
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their quest for class representative designation is highly problematic. And this* of course; assumes 
the other requirements of Rule 23(a) have otherwise been, met; which they have not. 
Then there is the matter of Rule 23(b). Strictly speaking, if the proposed class fills 
to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)*s ropriiemeni that common issues exist, the Court need sot consider Rale 
23(b)'s najnirements. fine Brouss&rd, 1SS R3d at 337, n.3. But least there be any doubt, it is also 
clear that the latterare also imfulffledbeje, la determining whether cox^ 
the court first identifier the substantive issues raised by the cause of action and Hie applicable 
defenses, xhen inquires into the ;>xoo£relevant to each issue. Sitner v. Rias, 661 F,2d 655, 672 (7th 
Cir. 19S1). What matters is not the number of common issues hut their significance. Mullen y. 
Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 R3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 1999). Notably, "the predominance 
criterion is Tar more demanding" than Rule 23(a)7s commonality reqiiireinenL Amchem, 521 U.S-
at 623-24. 
The Court has already remarked upon the ext<^ to wttch the claims of llie member 
of the putative class in this case would involve distinct inquiries leading to distinct conclusions as 
to each member. Since the Court has found insufficient commonality of issues for Rule 23(a)(2) 
purposes, a fartjarj ill concludes thai such issues do not predominate in the case for 23(b)(3) 
purposes. See, <-£_, Kohn v. Am. Hew. Found*.Inc., 178RILD.536,541 (D-Colo. 199B)(common 
legal theories and claims did not predominate where individual inquiries were necessary). See also 
HericUY. Premier Salons Irttfn^ 
390(4* Ctr_ 1986) (quoting 7 A C Wright & A. Miller, Petted Practice and Procedure, § 1788 at 
526 {2nd cd. 1986)) (The possibility of such individualized detexnunafcioiis would impose an 
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issues predominate, the economy and efficiency of class action, treatment are lost and the need ibr 
judicial supervision and the risk of confusion are magnified.") 
As for the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) that ihc class action device be superior to 
individual lawsuits for resolving tbc dispute, the Rule lists four fector^hearingon the deterrniMtion. 
a list not meant to be exhaustive. Of the few factors serf out in the Rule, two aie of particular 
relevance here; The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
commenced by or against members of the class [FedL & Ch- P. 23(b)(3)(B)] and the difficulties 
likely to be encountered in the management of a class suit £FedL R- Cxv. P. 23(b)(3)(D)]. Beyond 
Ihe factors mentioned in the Rule, a coun may also consider such factors as the avsilabiHty of 
alternative remedies that would be superior to a. class action, including relief through administrative 
proceedings. See Brawn v. Biite Crass and Blue Shield of Michigan, J/ic, 167 F.RJD. 40,43 (E.D. 
Mich. 1996). 
Plaintiffs7 case is contraindicaied based on each of these factors. 
As to related litigation: An attorney whose finn has represented State Farm in a 
number of lawsuits in Maryland involving PIP coverage, some ofivhich have involved the use of 
a computer database, has submitted an affidavit indicating that State Farm has often succeeded in 
defending such suits. Citing two cases from the District Court ofMaryl and for Montgomery County, 
for example, the affidavit indicates that in both cases the judges ruled in favor Of State Farm, 
agreeing that medical providers * bills were excessive and thai State Farm* with the assistance of 
information provided its Medicado review, properly reduced them* Cases fern other Maryland 
courts have been cited in which medical treatment was found to be unnecessary and where 
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been tried in Maryland, the fact that these individual suits have been prosecuted highlights yet 
again the rare problem w^ PIP claims 
rendto be ofahi^yindMdnahzed nature. Individual suite irayt^^ 
proceed. SeeHewhitt. 185 FJLD- at 211.221 CTTJhe existence of [non-class] litigation indicates 
that some of the interested parties have decided that individual actions arc an acceptable way to 
pn&sed and even may consider than preferable to a class action"). This also has hnpficafaons widi 
respect to the manageability factor. Numerous individual issues as compared to class issues 
obviously make a case much more difficult to manage. 
Ultim-tfely Plaint 
any differently from others where the necessity and reasonableness of medical treatment has been 
at issue. Consistently in such cases joints have found individualized inquiries to predominate and 
have declined certification. Ses, &g.9 Ross-Randolph v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. DKC 99-3344 at pp. 
17-1 S(D.Md, May 1 1 , 2 M 1 ) ( ^ ^ 
payment; \.. Plaintiff site no authority, and the court has found none, that deals with certification 
of a class of plaintiffs whose action is based on an insurer's failure to undertake a 'reasonable and 
tiecesBaiy * analysis as to eachmBmber3s individual claims, and in which the court found certification 
appitopriate"); Ammons v. Am. Family htuL Ins. Co., S97 P^d 860, 863 (Cote- Ct App, 1995) 
(holding class certification inappropriate in suit to recoup "reasonable and necessaty" transportation 
expenses incurred for treatment of injuries arising firom automobile accidents because "what is 
'reasonable and necessary7 may depend on the particular circumstances of individual cases"); Ralph 
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 835 5. W.2d 522, 524 (Mo. Ct. App* 1992) (same); McDonald v, 
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ceriLty a class action against insurer where '"reasonableness11 and "medical necessity" would have to 
be dtftemincd on casc-by-caae basis); Hylaszekv. Aetna Life Ins. Co.* No, 9-0-5961, 1998 WL 
381064, at mA (NJ>, Hi. July 1,1998) (commonality and manageability not satisfied where court 
woidd be required "to conduct a serins of mini-trials to examine raimerous factual issuer, including 
* * * the medical necessity of [particular] treatment in each individual case"); Scatt v, Ambassador 
Ins. Co.y 426 NJE-2d 952,95* (JUL App. CL 1981) ("adjudication of the named plaiatifis* claim [sic] 
would not establish a Tight to mgovery in any of the other purported class members" because of 
"necessity of making individual factual ^ termination* as to whether each cb&s member was 'legally 
entitled7 to damages iium an uniostrred motorist for bodily injuries sustained11); Fi&satn v. 
Ccmnartxcut Gen. LtfeXns. Co.,No. 93-C-916, 1994 WL 323313, at *6 (NJX ILL June 27,1994). 
Finally, there is the matter of the availability of alternative remedies, particularly in 
a case such ad this where a remedy is available from an administrative agency which has expertise 
in a relevant field, such as the insurance industry. Iti such cases, allowing for pursuit of claims in 
the administrative fbrum is often deemed superior tn aggregating all the claims into a class action 
suit. Cf Alien v. State Farm Fire and Cos. Co., 59 F,Supp.2d 1217, 1224-27 (S JX Ala. 1999) 
(dismissing proposed class action on primary jurisdiction grounds because evaluation of 
appropriateness of insurance deductible "requires familiarity with the insurance industry and the 
variety of factors analyzed in deciding a deductible—matters witbintbeConMrii^onei^s expertise:^ 
Id. at 1227)_ U appeals that for at least Iwoyearatto 
been examining the appropriateness of the use ofcomputer programs by insurers to aid in the review 
ofmedical claims, an inquiry in which StateFannand other inswap have participated. In particular, 
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and rejected by variolas companies using computerized fc©rcviewprogrtHBfl. Not only does the MIA. 
have the authority to ardar individualized remedies if the circumstances warrant; it has apparently 
indicated that it will exercise that authority. But if that is so, it is clear that adding a class action 
overlay in federal court makes little sense. SeePatillo v. ScAlesinger* 625 F.2d 262,265 (9th Cir. 
19S0) (rejecting class certification in favor of administrative procedures and noting advantages of 
eliinmzting costs and attorneys fees associated with class fitjgatiocQ. in any event; as a supplement 
to administrative proceedings, the small claims courts of the Maryland state system appear to be 
perfectly adequate venues to consider the claims of State Farm1 a PIP kssdreds if and when disputed 
arise over whether they are properly payable. 
For all these reasons, the Motion for Class Cattification will be DENIED, 
A separate Order utjplementmg this Opinion will be issued.7 
^ = 
**«** . *JL*~ 
l
 | PETER J. MESSOTE 
May Z__^ 2001 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
This decision MOOTS State Farm's Motion to Disqualify Ostrof as Putative Class 
Representative as well as Plainties* Motion to Add Class Repxcscn&iives. 
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Tab 4 
State Farm Insurance Companies 
57ATS FARM jj 
H 5NSURANC5 .. 
CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFIED POLICY 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I am custodian of the records pertaining to the issuance of 
pohcies by the Utah/Wyoming Divisions of the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company of 
Bloomington, Illinois. 
I further certify that the attached policy, number 747 7527-A29-44, is a copy of the policy issued to 
TUCKER, DEEVOY & MARIAN, 3290 W HANOVER PK DR, W VALLEY CITY, UT 84119, 
together with endorsements issued subsequently and effective as follows based on our available records. 
The policy was in effect on the accident date of AUGUST 5,1994. 
Xts£*M^ l^^cM- •yv\ .f-v-<? L^ 
DEBBIE RICHMOND, CPCU 
Underwriting Administrator 
STATE OF COLORADO 
COUNTY OF WELD 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of OCTOBER 2000. 
'L. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: May 5,2002 
3 : M ^ 4 3 3 - ^ - y * DECLARATIONS PAGE 
mmm^iuMtt^ntfiwit.; imtmisem immmmm mmmm 
:GG! a i d AVENUE SR££L£Y, CO sUo3o 
NAMED INSURED 
4 ^ - 1 3 4 2 - 5 0 A 
TUCKER, DEEVOY ft ^ARIAN 
3290 y HANOVER P< 9? 
w VaLLEY CITY UT 84119 
POLICY NUMBER 747 7 5 2 7 - A 2 9 - V 
POLICY PERIOD J U L - 2 9 - 5 4 TO J V J - 2 9 - 9 5 
STATE FA^M o a y ^ - M T PLAN 
NUMBER <J>5416 
DO NOT PAY PREMIUMS SHCWN ON THIS ?A<SE. 
SEPARATE STATEMENT ENCLOSED iF AMOUNT Db! 
DESCRIBED YEAR MAKE MODEL BODY STYLE VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER CLASS 
VEHICLE 90 HONDA C I V I C 2DR JH»E&9360LS027634 1 9 3 3 1 
COVERAGES (AS DEFINED IN POLICY) 
SYMBOL-PREMIUM-COVERAGE NAME LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
$134.30 sODILY INJURY/PROPERT 






LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
$26.00 MO-PAULT (SEE POLICY 
SoG.oG $250 DEDUCTIBLE COMPR $142.*Q $<:50 DEDUCTIBLE COLLI $2.40 EMERGENCY ROAD SERVIC 
M.5G UNINSURED MOTOR VEHIC 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
$3.00 UNDERINSURED MOTOR VE 
LIMITS Of LIABILITY 
Y DAMAGE LIABILITY 
-COVERAGE A-500ILY INJURY 
EACH PERSON, EACH ACCIDE 
50,COO 1uG,G00 
-COVERAGE A-3ROPE9TY DAMAGE 
EACJ ACCIDENT 
50 OQf 

















$373.70 TOTAL *REMIU<*! PQR POLICY PERIOD JUL-29-^4 TO JAN-20-9* 
MEMBERSHIP $16.00 
EXCEPTIONS AMD ENDORSEMENTS 
FINANCED- METRO HES^ CR UN, 1715 W 700 H, SALT LAKE CITY UT 3*114-1301. 
60B2P AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT: ChANG£S-D£fINED taORDS; INSURED4S DUTIES 
CQVEKAGES. 
6uviR AMENDMENT Of DEFINED WORDS AND NC-fAULT-COVERAGE P. 
£>3S5££,1 AMENDMENT Of UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE-COVERAGE U AJMD UNDERINaJR£D 
*0^0R VEHICLE-COVERAGE W. 
OWNED 3Y KIH TUCKER. 
hs 
AS* ~ A* T" 
PLEASE READ YOUR POLICY CAREFULLY IF YOU HAVE AN ACCIDENT, CONTACT YOUR STATE FARM AGENT 
OR ONE OF OUR CLAIM OFFICES AT ONCE (SEE "REPORTING A CLAIM-INSURED'S DUTIES" IN THIS POLICY) 
Authorized Representative 
INSURANCt 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Home Office, Bloomington, Illinois 





Policy Form 9844.3 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY 
BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS 
A MUTUAL COMPANY 
DEFINED WORDS 
WHICH ARE USED IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE POLICY 
We define some words to shorten the policy. This makes it 
easier to read and understand. Defined words are printed in 
bold face italics. You can pick them out easily. 
Bodily Injury — means bodily Injury to a person and 
sickness, disease or death which results from it. 
Car ~ means a land motor vehicle with four or more 
wheels, which is designed for use mainly on public roads. It 
does not include: 
1. any vehicle while located for use as a dwelling or 
other premises; or 
2. a truck-tractor designed to pull a trailer or 
semitrailer. 
Car Business - means a business or job where the purpose 
is to sell, lease, repair, service, transport, store or park land 
motor vehicles or traders. 
Insured — means the person, persons or organization defined 
as insureds in the specific coverage. 
Loss - defined in sections IV and V. 
Newly Acquired Car - means a car newly owned by you 
or your spouse if i t 
1. replaces your car; or 
2. is an added car and: 
a. if it is a private passenger car, we insure all other 
private passenger cars, or 
b. if it is other than a private passenger car, we 
insure all cars 
owned by you and your spouse on the date of its delivery 
to you or your spouse; 
but only if you or your spouse: 
1. tell us about it within 30 days after its delivery to 
you or your spouse; and 
2. if you or your spouse has more than one of our car 
policies, tell us which one is to apply; and 
3. pay us any added amount due. 
Non-Owned Car - means a car not owned by or registered 
or leased in the name of: 
1. you, your spouse; 
2. any relative unless at the time of the accident or 
loss: 
a. the car has been descnbed on the declarations 
page of a liability policy some time within the 
preceding 30 days; and 
b. you, your spouse or a relative who does not own 
or lease such car is the driver. 
3. any other person residing in the same household as 
you, your spouse or any relative; or 
4 an employer of you, your spouse or any relative. 
Non-owned car does not include a car: 
1. which is not in the lawful possession of the person 
operating it; or 
2. which has been operated by, rented by or in the 
possession of an insured during any part of each of 
the preceding 21 days; or 
3. operated by an insured who has operated or rented 
any car otherwise qualifying as a non-owned car 
during any part of more than 45 days in the 365 
days preceding the date of the accident or loss. 
Occupying - means in, on, entering or alighting from. 
Person - means a human being. 
Private Passenger Car — means a car: 
1. with four wheels; 
2. of the private passenger or station wagon type; and 
3. designed solely to carry persons and their luggage. 
Relative - means a, person related to you ox your spouse by 
blood, marriage, adoption or guardianship who lives with 
you, including those who usually make their home in your 
household but temporarily live elsewhere. 
Spouse - means your husband or wife while living with you. 
Temporary Substitute Car - means a car not owned by you 
or your spouse, if it replaces your car for a short time. Its use 
has to be with the consent of the owner. Your car has to be 
out of use due to its breakdown, repair, servicing, damage 
or bss. A temporary substitute car is not considered a 
non-owned car. 
Utility Vehicle - means a motor vehicle with: 
1. a pickup, panel or van body; and 
2. a Gross Vehicle Weight of 10,000 pounds or less. 
You or Your — means the named insured or named 
insureds shown on the declarations page. 





We, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, agree to insure you according to the terms of this 
policy based: 
1. on your payment of premium for the coverages you 
chose; and 
2. in reliance on your statements in these declarations. 
You agree, by acceptance of this policy that 
1. the statements in these declarations are your 
statements and are true; and 
2. we insure you on the basis your statements are true; 
and 
3. this policy contains all of the agreements betweei 
you and us or any of our agents. 
Unless otherwise stated in the exceptions space on th< 
declarations page, your statements are: 
1. Ownership. You are the sole owner of your car. 
2. Insurance and License History. Neither you no 
any member of your household within the past 
years has had: 
a. vehicle insurance canceled by an insurer; or 
b. a license to dnve or vehicle registratioi 
suspended, revoked or refused. 
3. Use. Your car is used for pleasure and business. 
WHEN AND WHERE COVERAGE APPLIES 
When Coverage Applies 
The coverages you chose apply to accidents and losses that 
take place during the policy period 
The policy period is shown under "Policy Period" on the 
declarations page and is for successive periods of six months 
each for which you pay the renewal premium. Payments 
must be made on or before the end of the current policy 
period The policy period begins and ends at 12:01 A.M. 
Standard Time at the address shown on the declarations 
page. 
Where Coverage Applies 
The coverages you chose apply: 
L in the United States of America, its territories an 
possessions or Canada; or 
2. while the insured vehicle is being shipped betwee 
their ports. 
The liability, no-fault and physical damage coverages als 
apply in Mexico within 50 miles of the United States horde 
A physical damage coverage toss in Mexico is determine 
on the basis of cost at the nearest United States point. 
Death, dismemberment and loss of sight coverage appli 
anywhere in the world. 
FINANCED VEHICLES 
If a creditor is shown in the declarations, we may pay any 
comprehensive or collision loss to: 
1. you and, if unpaid, the repairer; or 
2. you and such creditor, as its interest may appear, 
when we find it is not practical to repair your car; 
or 
3. the creditor, as to its interest, if your car has been 
repossessed. 
When we pay the creditor for toss for which you are not 
covered, we are entitled to the creditor's right of recovery 
against you to the extent of our payment. Our nght of 
recovery shall not impair the creditor's nght to recover ti 
full amount of its claim. 
The coverage for the creditor's interest only is valid until \ 
terminate it. We will not terminate such coverage becai 
of: 
1. any act or negligence of the owner or borrower; ( 
2. a change in the ownership or interest unknown 
us, unless the creditor knew of it and failed to I 
us within 10 days; or 
3. an error in the description of the vehicle. 
The date of termination of the creditor's interest will be 
least 10 days after the date we mail the termination notio 
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REPORTING A CLAIM - INSURED'S DUTIES 
[. Notice to Us of an Accident or Loss 
The insured must give us or one of our agents written 
notice of the accident or bss as soon as reasonably 
possible. The notice must give us: 
a. your name; and 
b. the names and addresses of all persons involved; 
and 
c. the hour, date, place and facts of the accident or 
bss; and 
d. the names and addresses of witnesses. 
Notice to Us of Qaim or Suit 
If a claim or suit is made against an insured, that insured 
must at once send us every demand, notice or claim 
made and every summons or legal process received. 
Other Duties Under the Physical Damage Coverages 
When there is a bss, you or the owner of the property 
also shall: 
a. make a prompt report to the police when the bss 
is the result of theft or larceny. 
b. protect the damaged vehicle. We will pay any 
reasonable expense incurred to do it 
c. show us the damage, when we ask. 
d. provide all records, receipts and invoices, or 
certified copies of them. We may make copies. 
e. answer questions under oath when asked by 
anyone we name, as often as we reasonably ask, 
and sign copies of the answers. 
. Other Duties Under No-Fault, Uninsured Motor Vehicle, 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle and Death, 
Dismemberment and Loss of Sight Coverages 
The person making claim also shall: 
a. give us all the details about the death, injury, 
treatment and other information we need to 
determine the amount payable. 
b. be examined by physicians chosen and paid by us 
as often as we reasonably may require. A copy of 
the report will be sent to the person upon written 
request. If the person is dead or unable to act, his 
or her legal representative shall authorize us to 
obtain all medical reports and records. 
c. (1) under the uninsured motor vehicle and 
underinsured motor vehicle coverages let us see 
the insured car the person occupied in the 
accident; 
(2) under the uninsured motor vehicle coverage 
report a "hit-and-run" accident to the police 
within 24 hours and to us within 30 days. 
Failure to give this notice within the time 
specified does not invalidate coverage if: 
(a) the person making claim shows it was not 
reasonably possible to ^vc the notice 
within the prescribed time; and 
(b) the notice is given as soon as reasonably 
possible. 
d. under the no-fault, uninsured motor vehicle and 
underinsured motor vehicle coverages, send us at 
once a copy of all suit papers when the party liable 
for the accident is sued for these damages. 
e. under the no-fault and death, dismemberment and 
loss of sight coverages, give us proof of claim on 
forms we furnish. 
5. Insured's Duty to Cooperate With Us 
The insured shall cooperate with us and, when asked, 
assist us in: 
a. making settlements; 
b. securing and giving evidence; 
c. attending, and getting witnesses to attend, hearings 
and trials. 
The insured shall not, except at his or her own cost, 
voluntarily: 
a. make any payment or assume any obligation to 
others; or 
J
 b. incur any expense, other than for first aid to others. 
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SECTION I - LIABILITY - COVERAGE A 
You have this coverage if "A" appears in the "Coverages" space on the declarations page. 
We will: 
1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally 
liable to pay because of: 
a. bodily injury to others, and 
b. damage to or destruction of property including 
loss of its use, 
caused by accident resulting from the ownership, 
maintenance or use of your ear; and 
2. defend any suit against an insured for such damages 
with attorneys hired and paid by us. We will not 
defend any suit after we have paid the applicable 
limit of our liability for the accic-jnt which is the 
basis of the lawsuit 
In addition to the limits of liability, we will pay for an 
insured any costs listed below resulting from such accident 
1. Court costs of any suit for damages. 
2. Interest on damages owed by the insured due to a 
judgment and accruing: 
a. after the judgment, and until we pay, offer or 
deposit in court, the amount due under this 
coverage; or 
b. before the judgment, where owed by law, but 
only on that part of the judgment we pay. 
3. Premiums or costs of bonds: 
a. to secure the release of an insured's property 
attached under a court order. The amount of 
the bond we pay for shall not be more than our 
limit of liability; and 
b. required to appeal a decision in a suit for 
damages if we have not paid our limit of 
liability that applies to the suit; and 
c. up to $250 for each bail bond needed because 
of an accident or traffic violation. 
We have no duty to furnish or apply for any bonds 
4. Expense incurred by an insured: 
a. for loss of wages or salary up to $35 per day if 
we ask the insured to attend the trial of a civil 
suit. 
b. for first aid to others at the tune of the accident 
c. at our request. 
We have the nght to investigate, negotiate and settle any 
claim or suit. 
Coverage for the Use of Other Cars 
The liability coverage extends to the use, by an insured, of a 




Who Is an Insured 
When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car c 
temporary substitute car, insured means: 
1. you; 
2. your spouse; 
3. the relatives of the first person named in 
declarations; 
4. any other person while using such a car if its m 
within the scope of consent of you or your spot 
and 
5. any other person or organization liable for the 
of such a cor by one of the above insureds. 
When we refer to a non-owned cor, insured moans: 
1. the first person named in the declarations; 
2. his or her spouse; 
3. their relatives; and 
4. any person or organiration which does not own 
hire the car but is liable for its use by one of 
above persons. 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR NON-OWN. 
CARS: 
i. IF THE DECLARATIONS STATE Tl 
"USE" OF YOUR CAR IS OTHER T¥U 
"PLEASURE AND BUSINESS"; OR 
2. WHILE: 
a. BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED ( 
USED BY ANY PERSON WHILE TH/ 
PERSON IS WORKING IN ANY C 
BUSINESS; OR 
b. USED IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS C 
OCCUPATION. This does not apply to 
private passenger car driven or occupied by I 
first person named in the declarations, his 
her spouse or their relatives. 
Trailer Coverage 
1. Trailers designed to be pulled by a private passen$ 
car or a utuHty vehicle, except those trailers in 1 
below, are covered while owned or used by 
insured. 
Farm implements and farm wagons are consider 
trailers while pulled on public roads by a car 
insure for liability 
These trailers are not described in the declaratw 
and no extra premium is charged. 
2. The following trailers are covered only if described 
on the declarations page and extra premium is paid: 
a. those trailers designed to be pulled by a private 
passenger car or a utility vehicle: 
(1) if designed to carry persons; or 
(2) while used with a motor vehicle whose use 
is shown as "commercial" on the 
declarations page (trailers used only for 
pleasure use are covered even if not 
described and no extra premium paid); or 
(3) while used as premises for office, store or 
display purposes; or 
b. any trailer not designed for use with a private 
passenger car or a utility vehicle. 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE WHEN A TRAILER 
IS USED WITH A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED 
OR HIRED BY YOU WHICH WE DO NOT 
INSURE FOR LIABILITY COVERAGE. 
limits of liability 
The ainount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown 
On the declarations page under "Limits of Liability — 
Coverage A -* Bodily Injury. Each Person, Each 
Accident". Uncier "Each Person" is the amount of 
coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one 
person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury 
and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury. 
Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of 
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each 
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 
mors persons in the same accident. 
The amount of property damage liability coverage is 
shown on the declarations page under "Limits of 
Liability - Coverage A - Property Damage, Each 
Accident". 
We will pay damages for which an insured is legally 
liable up to these amounts. 
The limits of liability are not increased because more 
than one person or organization may be an insured. 
A motor vehicle and attached trailer are one vehicle. 
Therefore, the limits are not increased. 
When two or more motor vehicles are insured under 
this section the limits apply separately to each. 
When Coverage A Does Not Apply 
In addition to the limitations of coverage in "Who Is an 
Insured" and 'Trailer Coverage": 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
1. WHILE ANY VEHICLE INSURED UNDER 
THIS SECTION IS: 
a. RENTED TO OTHERS OR USED TO 
CARRY PERSONS FOR A CHARGE. 
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This does not apply to the use on a share 
expense basis of: 
(1) a private passenger car; or 
(2) a uttiity vehicle, if all passengers are riding 
in that area of the vehicle designed by the 
manufacturer of the vehicle for carrying 
passengers. 
b. BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED OR 
USED BY ANY PERSON EMPLOYED 
OR ENGAGED IN ANY WAY IN A CAR 
BUSINESS. 
(1) If no other valid and collectible insurance 
is applicable, this provision applies to a 
motor vehicle business, its officers, agents 
and employees, but only to the extent the 
limits of liability of this policy exceed the 
limits of liability required by Utah law. 
(2) This provision in its entirety does not apply 
to: 
(a) you or your spouse; 
(b) my relative; 
(c) any resident of your household; or 
(d) any agent, employee or partner of you, 
your spouse, any relative or such 
resident. 
This coverage is excess for (c) and (d) 
above. 
2. FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO: 
a. A FELLOW EMPLOYEE WHILE ON 
THE JOB AND ARISING FROM THE 
MAINTENANCE OR USE OF A 
VEHICLE BY ANOTHER EMPLOYEE IN 
THE EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS. You and 
your spouse are covered for such injury to a 
fellow employee. 
b. ANY EMPLOYEE OF AN INSURED 
ARISING OUT OF HIS OR HER 
EMPLOYMENT. This does not apply to a 
household employee who is not covered or 
required to be covered under any workers 
compensation insurance. 
3. FOR ANY DAMAGES: 
a. FOR WHICH THE UNITED STATES 
MIGHT BE LIABLE FOR THE 
INSUREDS USE OF ANY VEHICLE. 
b. TO PROPERTY OWNED BY, RENTED 
TO, IN CHARGE OF OR 
TRANSPORTED BY AN INSURED. But 
coverage applies to a rented: 
(1) residence, or 
(2) private garage 
damaged by a car we insure. 
4 FOR ANY OBLIGATION OF AN INSURED, 
OR HIS OR HER INSURER, UNDER ANY 
TYPE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR 
DISABILITY OR SIMILAR LAW 
5 FOR LIABILITY ASSUMED BY THE 
INSURED UNDER ANY CONTRACT OR 
AGREEMENT 
If There Is Other Liability Coverage 
1 Policies Issued by Us to You 
if two or more vehicle liability policies issued by us to 
you appl> to the same accident, the total limits of 
' liability uftder all such policies shall not exceed that of 
the pokr with the highest limit of liability 
2 Other Lability Coverage Available From Other 
Sources 
Subject to item 1, if other vehicle liability coverage 
applies, we are liable only for our share of the damages 
Our share is the per cent that the limit of liability of this 
policy bears to the total of all vehicle liability coverage 
applicable to the accident 
3 Temporary Substitute Car, Non-Owned Car, Trailer 
If a temporary substitute car, a non-owned car or a trailer 
designed for use with a private passenger car or utility 
vehicle has other vehicle liability coverage on it, then this 
coverage is excess. 
4 Newly Acquired Car 
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE 
IS OTHER VEHICLE LIABILITY COVERAGE 
ON A NEWL Y ACQUIRED CAR. 
Motor Vehicle Compulsory Insurance Law or Fl 
Responsibility Law 
1 Out-of-State Coverage 
If an insured under the liability coverage is in a 
state or Canada and, as a non-resident, becomes 
to its motor vehicle compulsory insurance, fi 
responsibility or similar law 
a the policy will be interpreted to gwe the cc 
required by the law, and 
b the coverage so given replaces any coverage 
policy to the extent required by the law j 
insured's operation, maintenance or use of 
insured under this policy 
Any coverage so extended shall be reduced to the 
other coverage applies to the accident* In no evci 
a. person collect more than once. 
2. Financial Responsibility Law 
When certified under any law as proof of 
financial responsibility, and while required dun 
policy period, this policy shall comply with such 
the extent required. The insured agrees to repay 
any payment we would not have had to make un< 
terms of this policy except for this agreement 
Duplicate Coverage and Arbitration 
If an insured is or would be held legally liable i 
damages resulting from bodily injury sustained by any 
to whom benefits required under no-fault coverage 
been paid by another insurer, including the W 
Compensation Fund of Utah, we will reimburse the 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess o( the a 
recoverable 
The issue of liability and the amount will be decu 
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers 
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SECTION n - NO-FAULT - COVERAGE P 
You have this coverage if "P" with a number beside it appears in the "Coverages * space on the declarations page 
a number beside it is your coverage symbol 
Check your coverage symbol with the Schedule in the limits of liability for the choice of options you made 
T " with 
What We Pay 
We will pay in accordance with Utaii law for bodily injury 
to an insured caused by accident resulting from the 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle: 
1. Medical Benefits. This is reimbursement for reasonable 
expenses incurred for necessary 
a medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance, 
X-ray, nursing and rehabilitative services, 
b eyeglasses, hearing aids and prosthetic devices, and 
c remedial treatment by a recognized religious 
method of healing 
The most we will pay for all expenses is the amount 
shown in the Schedule for your coverage symbol The 
most we will pay for expenses for services and products 
furnished more than three years after the date of the 
accident is $3,000, less any amount paid or payable for 4 
expenses incurred during the first three years 
2. DisabiEty Benefits. This is reimbursement for 
a 85% of an insured's actual loss of 
(1) gross income from salary wages, tips, 
commissions, professional fees and profits from 
an individually owned business or farm, or 
(2) earning capacity 
due to that insured's continuous inability to work 
during a penod that 
(1) begins three days after the date of the accident 
and 
(2) ends either 
(a) when the insured is able to return to his or 
her usual job, 
(b) when the insured dies, or 
(c) 52 weeks after the penod begins, 
whichever occurs first 
If the insured's inability to work continues for more 
than two consecutive weeks after the accident, the 
penod begins on the date of the accident The most 
we will pay is the amount shown in the Schedule for 
your coverage symbol 
b reasonable expenses incurred for actually rendered 
services the insured would have performed for his 1 
or her household except for the injury These 
services must be performed during a penod that 
(1) begins three days after the date of the injury 2 
and 
(2) ends either 
(a) when the insured can perform these 
services, 
(b) when the insured dies, or 
(c) 365 days after the date of the accident, 
whichever occurs first 
If the insured's disability continues for more than 
14 consecutive days after the accident, the penod 
begins on *he date of the accident The most we pay 
per day is $20 
Funeral Benefits* This is reimbursement for reasonable 
funeral, buna! or cremation expenses The most we will 
pay for an insisted who GJ~S IS the amount shown in the 
Schedule for>'^nrcovera0e symbol 
Survivors' Benefits. Tr s is an amount paid to an 
insured's heirs when an msured dies as the result of the 
accident The most v*e will pay, if the death occurs 
within three years of the accident, is shown in the 
Schedule for your coverage symbol If the death occurs 
more than three years after the date of the accident, the 





you, your spouse or any relative: 
a. while occupying a motor vehicle, or 
b when a pedestrian, if the bodily injury results from 
physical contact with a motor vehicle; or 
2 any other person: 
a while occupying your car or a newly acquired car 
with the permission of 
(1) you, your spouse, any relative; or 
(2) the person dnvmg such car with your 
permission, or 
b while in Utah, when struck as a pedestrian by your 
car or a newly acquired car. 
Motor Vehicle - means 
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any self-propelled vehicle which is designed for use upon 
a highway including trailers and semi-trailers designed 
for use with such vehicles, and 
a vehicle which is propelled by electnc power obtamed 
from overhead wires but not operated upon rails 
It does not include traction engines, road rollers, farm 
tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels and well drillers 
Owner — means a, person who 
1 holds legal title to a motor vehicle; or 
2 has the nght to possession of a motor vehicle under a 
security agreement or lease with option to buy 
Pedestrian - means a person who is not occupying a motor 
vehicle. 
When Coverage P Does Not Apply 
fflERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY 
TO ANY PERSON: 
'l WHILE OCCUPYING OR WHEN STRUCK BY A 
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU OR ANY 
RELATIVE WHICH IS NOT YOUR CAR OR A 
NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. 
2 WHILE OPERATING YOUR CAR OR A NEWL Y 
ACQUIRED CAR: 
a WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF YOU OR 
YOUR SPOUSE, OR 
b IF NOT IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF IT 
3 WHOSE CONDUCT CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
INJURY UNDER ANY OF THE FOLLOWING 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
a CAUSING BODILY INJL/RY TO HIMSELF 
OR HERSELF INTENTIONALLY, OR 
b WHILE COMMITTING A FELONY 
4 WHILE OPERATING OR OCCUPYING A 
MOTORCYCLE OWNED BY YOUf YOUR 
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT 
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS 
POLICY, 
5 ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF ANY MOTOR 
VEHICLE WHILE LOCATED FOR USE AS A 
RESIDENCE OR PREMISES, 
6 DUE TO WAR OF ANY KIND, OR 
7 RESULTING FROM THE HAZARDOUS 
PROPERTIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
Settlement of Loss 
1. Deciding Amount 
If the insured and we cannot agree, it will be decided by 
arbitration upon wntten request ot the insured. Each 
party shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator 
These two shall select a third one If unable to agree on 
the third one within 30 days, either party may request a 
judge of a court of record in the county m which the 
arbitration is pending to select a third one The wntten 
decision of any two arbitrators shall be binding on each 
party The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness 
shall be paid by the party who hired them The cost of 
the third arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration 
shall be shared equally by both parties The arbitration 
shall take place in the county in which the insured 
resides unless the parties agree to another place State 
court rules governing procedure and admission of 
evidence shall be used 
2. Payment of Any Amount Due 
We will pay any amount due 
a. to the insured, or to any person or organization 
providing medical services or ^nxiucts, 
b to a parent or guardian, if tk, insured is a minor or 
an incompetent person, 
c to the surviving spouse; or 
d at our option, to a person authorized by law to 
receive such payment 
Payments will be made on a monthly basis within 35 
days after we have proof of the amount due 
If There Is Other Coverage 
1. No Duplication 
No person shall recover twice for the same expense or 
loss 
2 When you, your spouse or any relative sustains boddy 
injury while occupying or when struck by a motor vehicle 
which is not your car or a newly acquired car this 
coverage applies 
a as excess to any similar coverage which applies to 
the vehicle as primary coverage, but 
b only in the amount by which it exceeds the primary 
coverage 
If coverage under more than one policy applies as 
excess 
a the total limit of liability shall not exceed the 
difference between the limit of liability ot the 
coverage that applies as primary and the highest 
limit of liability of any one of the coverages that 
apply as excess, and 
b we are liable only for our share Our share is that 
per cent of the expenses or loss that the limit of 
liability of this policy for that benefit bears to the 
total limit of liabilitv for that benefit of all no fault 
coverage applicable as excess to the accident 
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3. If Coverage Is Available From More Than One Insurer 
Subject to items 1 and 2 above, if two or more insurers 
are liable to pay no-fault benefits 
a the total amount payable from all insurers shall not 
exceed the amount payable under the pohcy with 
the highest limit of liability, and 
b we are liable only for our share Our share is that 
per cent of the expenses or loss that the limit of 
liability of this policy for that benefit bears to the 
total limit of liability for that oenefit of all no-fault 
coverage applicable to the accident 
Constitutionality 
[f a court declares any of the Utah motor vehicle insurance 
aw invalid, we may refigure the premium and change the 
coverage If the refigured premium is greater than what has 
been paid, you must pay us the difference 
Limits of Liability 
1. The Most We Pay. The most we pay for each insured 
who sustains bodrfy injury m any one accident shall not 
exceed the limit shown in the Schedule applicable to 
each benefit for your coverage symbol Any amount 
payable shall be reduced by all amounts the insured is 
entitled to receive 
a under anv worker's compensation, disability or 
similar law, or 
b from the United States or any of its agencies 







































SECTION ffl - UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U AND 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W 
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U 
You have this coverage if "U" appears in the "Coverages" 
space on the declarations page. 
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally 
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured 
motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident 
arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an 
uninsured motor vehicle. 
Uninsured Motor Vehicle — means: 
1. a land motor vehicle, the ownership, maintenance 
or use of which is: 
a. not insured or bonded for bodily injury liability 
at the time of the accident; or 
b. insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at 
the time of the accident; but 
(1) the limits of liability are less than required 
by the financial responsibility act of the 
state where your car is mainly garaged; or 
(2) the insuring company denies coverage or 
is or becomes insolvent; or 
2. an unidentified "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle 
which was the proximate cause of the bodily injury. 
The insured must show the existence of the other 
motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence, 
which shall consist of more than the insured's 
testimony. 
An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor 
vehicle: 
1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 
2. furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or 
any relative; 
3. owned or operated by a self-insurer under any 
motor vehicle financial responsibility law, a motor 
carrier law or any similar law; 
4. owned by any government or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies; 
5. designed for use mainly otf public roads except 
while on public roads; or 
6. while located for use as premises. 
Who Is an Insured 
Insured - means the person or persons covered by 
uninsured motor vehicle coverage. 
This is: 
1. you, your spouse and your relatives; and 
2. any other person while occupying: 
a. your car, d. temporary substitute car, a newly 
acquired car or a trailer attached to such car. 
Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of 
the consent of you or your spouse; or 
b. a car not owned by you, your spouse or any 
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It 
has to be driven by the first person named in 
the declarations or that person's spouse and 
within the scope of the owner's consent. 
Such other person occupying a vehicle used to carry 
persons for a charge is not an insured. 
any person entitled to recover damages because of 
bodily injury to an insured under 1. and 2. above. 
Deciding Fault and Amount 
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the 
insured and us: 
1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages 
from the owner or driver of the uninsured motor 
vehicle; and 
2. If so, in what amount? 
If there is no agreement, these questions will be decided by 
arbitration upon written request of the insured. Each party 
shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. These two 
shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the third one 
within 30 days either party may request a judge of a court 
of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending 
to select a third one. The written decision of any two 
arbitrators shall be binding on each party. 
The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be 
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third 
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared 
equally by both parties. 
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the 
insured resides unless the parties agree to another place. 
State court rules governing procedure and admission of 
evidence shall be used 
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or 
organization obtained without our written consent. 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE W 
You have this coverage if "W" appears in the "Coverages" 
space on the declarations page. 
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally 
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an 
underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused 
by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use 
of an underinsured motor vehicle. 
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THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL: 
1 THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY 
INJURY LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES 
THAT APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY 
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR 
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS; OR 
2 SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING 
PART OF THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO 
THE INSURED. 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle - means a land motor vehicle: 
1. the ownership, maintenance or use of which is insured 
or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the 
accident; and 
2. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability: 
a. are less than the amount of the insured's damages; 
or 
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other 
than the insured to less than the amount of the 
insured's damages. 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor 
vehicle: ' * 
insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 
furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or any 
relative; 
owned by any government or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies; 
designed for use mainly off public roads except while 
on public roads; 
while located for use as premises; or 
defined as an "uninsured motor vehicle' in your policy. 
Who Is an Insured 
Insured — means the person or persons 
underinsured motor vehicle coverage: 
This is: 
covered by 
1. The first person named in the declarations; 
2. his or her spouse; 
3. their relatives; and 
4. any other person while occupying; 
a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly 
acquired car, or a trailer attached to such car. 
Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of 
the consent of you or your spouse; or 
b. a car not owned by you, your spouse or any 
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It 
has to be driven by the first person named in 
the declarations or that person's spouse and 
within the scope of the owner's consent. 
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Such other person occupying a vehicle used to carry 
persons for a charge is not an insured. 
5. any person entided to recover damages because of 
bodily injury to an insured under 1 through 4 above. 
Deciding Fault and Amount 
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the 
insured and us: 
1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages 
from the owner or driver of the underinsured motor 
vehicle; and 
2. If so, in what amount? 
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be decided by 
arbitration upon written request of the insured or us. 
Each party shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. 
These two shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the 
third one within 30 days either party may request a judge of 
a court of record m the county in which the arbitration is 
pending to select a third one. The written decision of any 
two arbitrators shall be binding on each party. 
The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be 
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third 
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared 
equally by both parties. 
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the 
insured resides unless the parties agree to another place. 
State court rules governing procedure and admission of 
evidence shall be used. 
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or 
organization obtained without our written consent. 
Payment of Any Amount Due - Coverages U and W 
We will pay any amount due: 
1. to the insured; 
2. to a parent or guardian if the insured is a minor or 
an incompetent person; 
3. to the surviving spouse; or 
4. at our option, to a person authorized by law to 
receive such payment. 
limits of Liability - Coverage U 
I. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability - U — Each Person, 
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount 
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one 
person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury 
and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury. 
Under "Each Accident" is the total amdunt of 
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each 
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 
more persons in the same accident. 
2. Any amount payable under this coverage shall be 
reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for the 
insured: 
a. by or for any person or organization who is or may 
be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the 
insured; or 
, b. for bodily injury under the liability coverage. 
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage 
shall reduce any amount payable to that person under 
the bodily injury liability coverage. 
4. Any amount paid or payable under 
a. the no-fault coverage; or 
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits, or 
similar law 
will not be paid for again as damages under this 
coverage. This does not reduce the limits of liability of 
this coverage. 
5* The limits of liability are not increased because: 
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy; 
or 
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the 
accident. 
Limits of Liability — Coverage W 
1. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability-— W — Each Person, 
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount 
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one 
person. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of 
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each 
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 
more persons in the same accident. 
2. Any amount paid or payable under: 
a. the no-fault coverage; or 
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits or 
similar law 
will not be paid for again as damages under this 
coverage. This does not reduce the limits of liability of 
this coverage. 
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage 
shall reduce any amount payable to that person for 
bodily injury under the liability coverage. 
4. The limits of liability are not increased because: 
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy; 
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the 
accident; or 
c. more than one underinsured motor vehicle is 
involved in the same accident. 
5. The most we pay will be the lesser of: 
a. the difference between the amount of the insured's 
damages for bodily injury, and the amount paid to 
the insured by or for any person or organization 
b. 
who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily 
injury; or 
the limits of liability of this coverage. 
When Coverage U Does Not Apply 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
1. FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR 
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH-ANY 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE 
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY. 
2. FOR BODILYINJURYTO AN INSURED: 
a. WHILE OCCUPYING, OR 
b. THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY 
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR 
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT 
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS 
POLICY. 
3. TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS: 
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
b. A SELF-INSURER UNDER ANY 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION, OR* 
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW. 
, c. ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY OR 
AGENCY. 
When Coverage W Does Not Apply 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
1. FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR 
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE 
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY AND 
THEREBY IMPAIRS OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER 
OUR PAYMENTS. 
2. FOR BODILY INJURYTO ANY INSURED: 
a. WHILE OCCUPYING, OR 
b. THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY 
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR 
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT 
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS 
POLICY. 
3. TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS: 
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
b. A SELF-INSURER UNDER ANY 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION, OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW. 




4. FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES OR INTEREST 
AWARDED TO OR CLAIMED BY THE 
INSURED. 
5 FOR ANY PERSON WHOSE CLAIM FOR 
BODILY INJURY ARISES OUT OF BODILY 
INJURY SUSTAINED BY ANOTHER PERSON. 
6. FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED 
BY, ON BEHALF OF, OR AWARDED TO THE 
INSURED. 
If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage 
1. Regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved, 
the number of persons covered or claims made, vehicles 
or premiums shown in the policy or premiums paid, the 
limit of liability for uninsured motor vehicle coverage 
shall not be added to or stacked upon limits for such 
coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine 
the amount of coverage available to an insured injured 
in any one accident. 
If the insured sustains bodily injury and other uninsured 
motor vehicle coverage applies: 
a. ' the insured must elect one policy under which to 
make a claim; and 
b. COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY DOES 
NOT APPLY IF THE INSURED ELECTS ANY 
OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE UNDER WHICH TO MAKE A 
CLAIM. 
3. THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE 
IS OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. 
If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage 
1. If the insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian and 
other underinsured motor vehicle coverage applies: 
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages 
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the 
highest limit of liability; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured 
motor vehicle coverage applicable to the accident. 
If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying your 
car, and your car is described on the declarations page 
of another policy providing underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage: 
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages 
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the 
highest limit of liability; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all such 
underinsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to 
the accident. 
If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a 
vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any relative, 
this coverage applies: 
a. as excess to any underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary 
coverage, but 
b. only in the amount by which it exceeds the primary 
coverage. 
If coverage under more than one policy applies as 
excess: 
a. the total limit of liability shall not exceed the 
difference between the limit of liability of the 
coverage that applies as primary and the highest 
limit of liability of any one of the coverages that 
apply as excess; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured 
motor vehicle coverage applicable as excess to the 
accident. 
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE 
IS OTHER UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. 
SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGES 
Loss - means, when used in this section, each direct and 
accidental loss of or damage to 
1 your cat; 
2 its equipment which is common to the use of your 
car as a, vehicle, or 
3 clothes and luggage insured, and 
4 a detachable living quarters attached or removed 
from your cor for storage Detachable living 
quarters includes its body and items securely fixed 
in place as a permanent part of the body You must 
have told us about the living quarters before the bss 
and paid any extra premium needed 
COMPREHENSIVE - COVERAGE D. You have this 
coverage if' D" appears in the "Coverages" space on the 
Geclarations page If a deductible applies, the amount is 
shown by the number beside "D" 
1 Loss to Your Car We will pay for loss to your car 
EXCEPT LOSS BY COLLISIONbut only for the 
amount of each such bss in excess of the deductible 
amount, if any 
Breakage of glass, or bss caused by missiles, falling 
objects, fire, theft, larceny, explosion, earthquake 
windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or 
vandalism, not or civil commotion, is payable 
under this coverage Loss due to hitting or being 
hit by a bird or an animal is payable under this 
coverage 
2 We will repay you for transportation costs if your 
car is stolen We will pay up to $16 per day for the 
period that begins 48 hours after you tell us of the 
theft. The period ends when we offer to pay for 
bss. 
COLLISION - 80% - COVERAGE F. You have this 
coverage if **F' appears in the 'Coverages" space on the 
declarations page 
We will pay 80% of the first $250 and 100% over that 
amount of bss to your car caused by collision. If the collision 
is with another motor vehicle insured by us, we will pay 
100% of the bss. 
COLLISION ~ COVERAGE G You have this coverage 
if "G" appears in the "Coverages" space on the declarations 
page The deductible amount is shown by the number beside 
*G" 
We will pay for bss to your car caused by collision but only 
for the amount of each such bss in excess of the deductible 
amount If the colSswn is with another motor vehicle 
insured with us, you do not pay your deductible if it is $100 
or lebS as we pay it 
CoUaswn - means your car upset or hit or was hit by a 
vehicle or other object 
Clothes and Luggage - Comprehensive and Colhsiot 
Coverages 
We will pay for bss to clothes and luggage owned by the 
first person named in the declarations, his or her spouse, anc 
their relatives. These items have to be in or on your car 
Your car has to be covered under this policy for 
1 Comprehensive, and the bss caused by fire 
lightning, flood, falling objects, explosion 
earthquake or theft If the bss is due to theft, 
YOUR ENTIRE CAR MUST HAVE BEEN 
STOLEN, or 
2 Collision, and the bss caused by collision. 
We will pay up to $200 for bss to clothes and luggage in 
excess of any deductible amount shown for comprehensive 
or collision $200 is the most we will pay in any one 
occurrence even though more than one person his a bss. 
This coverage is excess over any other coverage 
Limit of Liability - Comprehensive and Collision Coverages 
The limit of our liability for bss to property or any part of 
it is the lower of 
1 the actual cash value or 
2 the cost of repair or replacement 
Actual cash value is determined by the market value, age 
and condition, at the time the bss occurred Any deductible 
amount that applies is then subtracted The cost of repair 
or replacement is based upon 
1 the cost of repair agreed upon by you and us, or 
2 the lower of 
a. a competitive bid approved by us, or 
b an estimate written based upon the prevailing 
competitive price The prevailing competitive 
price means labor rates, parts paces and 
material prices charged by a substantial 
number of the repair facilities in the area where 
the car is to be repaired as determined by a 
survey made by us If you ask, we will identify 
some facilities that will perform the repairs at 
the prevailing competitive price 
Any deductible amount that applies is then subtracted 
Settlement of Loss - Comprehensive and Collision 
Coverages 
We have the nght to settle a bss with you or the owner of 
the property m one of the following ways 
1 pay up to the actual cash value 
2 pay to repair or replace the property or part with 
like kind and quality If the repair or replacement 
results in better than like kind and quality, you must 
pay for the amount of the betterment; 
3. return the stolen property and pay for any damage 
due to the theft; or 
4. take the property at an agreed value; but it cannot 
be abandoned to us. 
If we can pay the loss under either comprehensive or 
collision, we will pay under the coverage where you collect 
the most. 
When there is loss to your car, clothes and luggage in the 
same occurrence, any deductible will be applied first to the 
bss to your car. You pay only one deductible. 
EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE - COVERAGE H. 
You have this coverage if "H" appears in the "Coverages" 
space on the declarations page. 
We will pay the fair cost you incur for your car for 
1. mechanical labor up to one hour at the place of its 
breakdown; 
2. towing to the nearest place where the necessary 
repairs can be made during regular business hours 
if it will not run; 
3. towing it out if it is stuck on or immediately next to 
a public highway; 
4. delivery of gas, oil, loaned battery, or change of tire. 
WE DO NOT PAY FOR THE COST OF 
THESE ITEMS. 
CAR RENTAL EXPENSE - COVERAGE R. You have 
this coverage if "K" appears in the "Coverages" space on 
the declarations page. 
We will repay you up to SI0 per day when you rent a car 
from a car rental agency or garage due to a loss to your car 
which would be payable under coverage D, F or G, starting: 
1. when it cannot run due to the loss; or 
2. if it can run, when you leave it at the shop for 
agreed repairs; 
and ending when: 
1. it has been repaired or replaced, or 
2. we offer to pay for the loss, or 
3. you incur 30 days rent, 
whichever comes first. 
Any car rent payable under coverage R is REDUCED TO 
THE EXTENT IT IS PAYABLE UNDER 
COMPREHENSIVE. 
CAR RENTAL AND TRAVEL EXPENSES -
COVERAGE RL You have this coverage if W*R1" appears L 
m the "Coverages1' space on the declarations page. 
a. repay you up to $16 per day when you rent a 
car from a car rental agency or garage; OR 
b. pay you $10 per day if you do not rent a car 
while your car is not usable 
due to a loss to your car which would be payable 
under coverage D, F or G. 
This applies during a period starting: 
a. when your car cannot run due to the bss; or 
b. if your car can run, when you leave it at the 
shop for agreed repairs; 
and ending: 
a. when it has been repaired or replaced, or 
b. (1) when we offer to pay for the loss, if your 
car is repairable, or 
(2) five days after we offer to pay for the loss, 
if: 
(a) your car was stolen and not recovered, 
or 
(b) we declare it a total loss, 
whichever'comes first. 
Any car rent payable under this coverage is 
REDUCED TO THE EXTENT IT IS 
PAYABLE UNDER COMPREHENSIVE. 
2. Travel Expenses. If your car cannot run due to a 
loss which would be payable under coverage D, F 
or G more than 50 miles from home, we will repay 
you for expenses incurred by you, your spouse and 
any relative for: 
a. Commercial transportation fares to continue to 
your destination or home. 
b. Extra meals and lodging needed when the loss 
to your car causes a delay enroute. The 
expenses must be incurred between the time of 
the bss and your arrival at your destination or 
home or by the end of the fifth day, whichever 
occurs first 
c. Meals, lodging and commercial transportation 
fares incurred by you or a person you choose to 
drive your car from the place of repair to your 
destination or home. 
3. Rental Car - Repayment of Deductible Amount 
Expense. We will repay the expense of any 
deductible amount you are required to pay the 
owner under comprehensive or collision coverage 
in effect on a substitute car rented from a car rental 
agency or garage. 
Total Amount of Expenses Payable — Coverage Rl 
I. Car Rental Expense. We will: 
The most we will pay for the total of the "Car Rental 
Expense1' and "Rental Car - Repayment of 
Deducuble Amount Expense" incurred m any one 
occurrence is $400. 
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2. The most we will pay for 'Travel Expenses" incurred 
by all persons in any one occurrence is $400 
Trailer Coverage 
1 Owned Trailer 
Your trailer is covered 
a when it is described on the declarations page of the 
policy, and 
b for the coverages shown as applying to it 
2 Non-Owned Trailer or Detachable Living Quarters 
Any physical damage coverage in force on your car 
applies to a non-owned 
a trailer, if it is designed for use with a private 
passenger car, or 
b detachable living quarters unit 
used by the first person named in the declarations, his 
or her spouse or their relatives. 
The most we will pay under the comprehensive or 
collision coverage for a bss to such non-owned trailer 
or unit is $500 
A non-owned trailer or detachable living quarters unit 
is one that 
a is not owned by or registered in the name of 
(1) yoUy your spouse', any relative; 
(2) any other person residing in the same 
household as you, your spouse or any relative; 
or 
(3) an employer of you, your spouse or any relative; 
and 
b has not been used by, rented by or in the possession 
of you, your spouse or any relative during any part 
of each of the preceding 21 days, and 
c is used by you, your spouse or any relative and such 
persons have not used or rented any non-owned 
trailer or detachable living quarters unit for more 
than 45 days in the 365 days preceding the date of 
the accident or loss. 
Coverage for the Use of Other Cars 
The coverages in this section you have on your car extend to 
a loss to a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or 
a non-owned car. These coverages extend to a non-owned car 
while it is driven by or in the custody of an insured. 
Insured — as used in this provision means 
1 the first person named in the declarations, 
2 his or her spouse; or 
3 their relatives. 
When Coverages D, F, G, H, R and Rl Do Not Apply 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR 
1 A NON-OWNED CAR: 
a. IF THE DECLARATIONS STATE THE 
"USE" OF YOUR CAR IS other than pleasure 
and business, 
b WHILE BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED OR 
USED BY ANY PERSON WHILE THAT 
PERSON IS WORKING IN ANY CAR 
BUSINESS; OR 
c WHILE USED IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS 
OR OCCUPATION This does not apply to a 
private passenger car driven or occupied by the first 
person named in the declarations, his or her spouse 
or their relatives. 
2 ANY VEHICLE WHILE 
a RENTED TO OTHERS OR USED TO CARRY 
PERSONS FOR A CHARGE This does not 
apply to the use on a share expense basis, OR 
b- SUBJECT TO ANY LIEN, RENTAL OR 
SALES AGREEMENT NOT SHOWN IN THE 
DECLARATIONS 
3 LOSSTO ANY VEHICLE DUE TO 
a TAKING BY ANY GOVERNMENTAL 
AUTHORITY, 
b WAR OF ANY KIND, 
c AND LIMITED TO WEAR AND TEAR, 
FREEZING, MECHANICAL OR 
ELECTRICAL BREAKDOWN OR FAILURE 
This does not apply when the bss is the result of a 
theft covered by this policy Nor does it apply to 
emergency road service, OR 
d CONVERSION, EMBEZZLEMENT OR 
SECRETION BY ANY PERSON WHO HAS 
THE VEHICLE DUE TO ANY LIEN, 
RENTAL OR SALES AGREEMENT 
4 TIRES unless 
a stolen, or damaged by fire or vandalism, or 
b other loss covered by this section happens at the 
same time 
5 TAPES OR DISCS FOR RECORDING OR 
REPRODUCING SOUND 
6 ANY RADAR DETECTOR 
If There Is Other Coverage 
1 Policies Issued by Us to You 
If two or more vehicle policies issued by us to you apply 
to the same loss or occurrence, we will pay under the 









sply to a 
y the first 
ler spouse 
Coverage Available From Other Sources 
Subject to item 1, if other coverage applies to the loss 
or expenses, we will pay only our share. Our share is the 
per cent the limit of liability of this policy bears to the 
total of all coverage that applies. 
Temporary Substitute Car, Non-Owned Car, Trailer 
4. Newly Acquired Car 
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY IF 
THERE IS SIMILAR COVERAGE ON A NEWLY 
ACQUIRED CAR. 
No Benefit to Bailee 
These coverages shall not benefit any carrier or other bailee 
for hire liable for loss. 
If a temporary substitute cary a non-owned car or trader Two or More Vehicles 
designed for use with a private passenger car has other 
coverage on it, then this coverage is excess. 
If two or more of your cars are insured for the same 
coverage, the coverage applies separately to each. 




















DEATH, DISMEMBERMENT AND LOSS OF SIGHT 
- COVERAGES 
If "S" is shown in the "Coverages'* space on the declarations 
page each insured has the coverage. 
We will pay the amount shown in the schedvb that applies 
for death, or loss, caused by accident. The ins .red has to be 
occupying or be struck by a land motor vehicle or trailer. 
The death or loss must be the direct result of the accident 
and not due to any other cause. The death or loss must 
occur within 90 days of the accident. 
Insured - means a person listed under "Persons Insured -
Coverage S" on the declarations page. 
Loss - means the loss of: 
1. the foot or hand, cut off through or above the ankle 
or wrist; or 
2. the whole thumb or finger; or 
3. all sight. 
The Most We Pay 
The most we will pay because of the death of, or loss to, the 
insured, except as provided below, is shown under 
"Amounts" next to his or her name on the declarations 
page. 
The amount shown in the schedule for death or loss is 
doubled for an insured who, at the time of the accident, is 
x*saig the vehicle's complete restraint system as 
recommended by the vehicle's manufacturer. 
If the insured dies as a result of this accident any payment 
made or due for loss reduces the amount of the death 
payment 
SCHEDULE 
If amount under S in 
the declarations is: 
Death 
Loss of: 
hands; feet; sight of eyes; one 
hand & one foot; or one hand 
one foot & sight of one eye 
one hand or one foot; or sight of 
one eye 
thumb & finger on one hand; or 
three lingers 














Payment of Any Amount Due 
We will pay any amount due: 
1. to the insured; 
2. to a parent or guardian if the insured is a minor or 
an incompetent person; 
3. to the surviving spouse; or 
4. at our option, to any person or organization 
authorized by law to receive such payment 
Any payment made is to its extent a complete discharge of 
our obligations. We are not responsible for the way the 
money is used. 
Autopsy 
We have the right to have an autopsy made where it is not 
forbidden by law. 
When Coverage S Does Not Apply 
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY TO: 
19 
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AN INSURED WHILE ON THE JOB, 
OPERATING OCCUPYING, LOADING OR 
UNLOADING 3 
d AN EMERGENCY VEHICLE OR 
b A VEHICLE USED IN THE INSURED'S 
BUSINESS OR JOB 
But 1 b does not apply if the vehicle is 
(1) a private passenger car or school bus, or 
(2) of the pickup or van type, with a Gross Vehicle 
Weight of 10,000 pounds or less, while not used 
for delivery 4 
2 AN INSURED WHILE 
a ON THE JOB IN ANY CAR BUSINESS; OR 
b OCCUPYING ANY 
(1) VEHICLE WHILE BEING USED IN A 
RACE, OR 
(2) MILITARY VEHICLE 
AN INSURED WHILE OCCUPYING OR 
THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY A MOTOR 
VEHICLE OR TRAJLER 
a THAT RUNS ON RAILS OR 
CRAWLER-TREADS, 
b DESIGNED FOR USE MAINLY OFF 
PUBLIC ROADS WHILE OFF PUBLIC 
ROADS, OR 
c LOCATED FOR USE AS PREMISES 
THE DEATH OF OR LOSS TO AN INSURED 
DUE TO 
a. DISEASE except pus forming infection due to 
bodily vnj ay received in the accident, or 
b SUICIDE OR ATTEMPTED SUICIDE WHILE 
SANE OR INSANE, OR 














- Policy Terms. The terms of this policy may be 
changed or waived only by: 
(1) an endorsement signed by one of our executive 
officers; or 
(2) the revision of this policy form to give broader 
coverage without an extra charge. If any 
coverage you carry is changed to give broader 
coverage, we will give you the broader coverage 
without the issuance of a new policy as of the 
date we make the change effective. 
b. Change of Interest. No change of interest in this 
policy is effective unless we consent in writing. 
However, if you die, we will protect as named 
insured, except under death, dismemberment and 
loss of sight coverage: 
(1) your surviving spouse; 
(2) any person with proper custody of your car, a 
itewly acquired car or a temporary substitute car 
until a legal representative is qualified; and then 
(3) the legal representative while acting within the 
scope of his or hex duties. 
Policy notice requirements are met by mailing the 
notice to the deceased named insured's last known 
address, 
c Consent of Beneficiary. Consent of the beneficiary 
under death, dismemberment and loss of sight 
coverage is not needed to cancel or change the 
policy. 
d- Joint and Individual Interests. When there are two 
or more named insureds, each acts for all to cancel 
or change the policy. 
Suit Against Us 
There is no right of action against us: 
&• until all the terms of this policy have been met; and 
b. under the liability coverage, until the amount of 
damages an insured is legally liable to pay has been 
finally determined by: 
(1) judgment after actual trial, and appeal if any; 
or 
(2) agreement between the insured, the claimant 
and us. 
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or his or 
bsr estate shall not refiere as of our obligations 
c
- under all other coverages until the earlier of: 
(1) 60 days after we receive proof of loss; 
(2) our waiver of proof of loss: or 




3. Our Right to Recover Our Payments 
a. Death, dismemberment and loss of sight coverage 
paytnents are not recoverable by us. 
b. Under uninsured motor vehicle coverage: 
CO We are subrogated to the extent of our 
payments to the proceeds of any settlement the 
injured person recovers from any party liable 
for the bodily injury. 
(2) if the person to or for whom we have made 
payment has not recovered from the party at 
fault, he or she shall: 
(a) keep these rights in trust for us; 
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and 
(c) when we ask, take action through our 
representative to recover our payments. 
\Ve are to be repaid our payments, costs and 
fees of collection out of any recovery. 
c. Und^r no-fault coverage we are entitled to recover* 
our payments in accord with Utah law. 
d. Und^r underinsured motor vehicle coverage: 
CO tye are entitled, to the extent of our payments, 
to the proceeds of any settlement the insured 
recovers from any party liable for the bodily 
injury, other than payments from bodily injury 
KabiSfy bonds or policies made prior to our 
Payment. 
(2) if the insured has not been fully compensated 
for the bodily injury by the party at fault and 
We make payment for the bodily injury, the 
^Hsured shall: 
(&) keep these rights in trust for us: 
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and' 
fc) when we ask, take action through our 
representative to recover the amount of 
our payments. 
We are to be repaid our payments, costs and 
fees of collection out of any such recovery, 
e. Under all other coverages the right of recovery of 
any Party we pay passes to us. Such party shall: 
(1) Aot hurt our rights to recover; and 
(2) help us get our money back. 
Cancellation 
How You, May Cancel. You may cancel your policy by 
notifying v^ fn writing of the date to cancel, which must 
be later tl\an the date you mail or deliver it to us. We 
may waive these requirements by confirming the date 
and time 0)f cancellation to you in writing. 
How and When We May Cancel. We may cancel your 
policy by wntten notice, mailed to your last known 
address. The notice shall give the date cancellation is 
effective. The mailing of it shall be sufficient proof of 
notice. 
If we mail or deliver a notice of cancellation to you 
during the first 59 days following the policy effective 
date, the canceflation notice will be mailed to you at 
least 10 days before the cancellation effective date. 
After the policy has been in force for more than 59 days, 
any notice of cancellation will be mailed to you at least 
a, 10 days before the cancellation effective date if the 
cancellation is because you did not pay the 
premium; or 
b. 30 days before the cancellation effective date if the 
canceflation is because of any other reason. 
Unless we mail or deliver a notice of cancellation to you 
within 59 days of the policy effective date, we will not 
cancel your policy before the end of the current policy 
period unless: 
a. you fail to pay the premium when due; or 
b. you or any other person who usually drives your cor 
have had his or her driver's license under 
suspension or revocation: 
(1) during the policy period; or 
(2) if the policy is renewed; 
(a) during the current policy period; or 
(b) 180 days just before its latest renewal date. 
Return of Unearned Premium. ]fyou cancel, premium 
may be earned on a short rate basis. If we cancel, 
premium will be earned on a pro-rata basis. Any 
unearned premium may be returned at the time we 
cancel or within a reasonable time thereafter. Delay in 
the return of unearned premium does not affect the 
cancellation. 
5. Renewal 
Unless we mail or deliver to you a notice of cancellation 
or a notice of our intention not to renew the policy, we 
" agree to renew the policy for the next policy period 
upon your payment of the renewal premium when due. 
It is agreed that the renewal premium will be based 
upon the rates in effect, the coverages carried, the 
applicable limits of liability, deductibles and other 
elements that affect the premium that apply at the time 
of renewal 
Other elements that may affect your premium include, 
but are not limited to: 
a. drivers of your cor and their ages and marital status; 
b. your cor and its use; 
c. eligibility for discounts or other premium credits; 
d. applicability of a surcharge based either on accident 
history, or on other factors. 
A notice of our intention to not renew will be mailed to 
your last known address at least 30 days before the end 
of the current policy period. The mailing of it shall be 
sufficient proof of notice. 
6. Change of Residence 
When we receive notice that the location of principal 
garaging of the vehicle described on the declarations 
page has been changed, we have the right to recalculate 
the premium based on the coverages and rates 
applicable in the new location. When the change of 
location is from one state to another and you are a risk 
still acceptable to us at the time you notify us of the 
change, we shall replace this policy with the policy form 
currently in use in the new state of garaging. The word 
"state" means one of the United States of America, the 











































Membership. The membership fees set out in this policy, 
which are in addition to the premiums, are not 
returnable but entitle the first insured named in the 
declarations to insure one vehicle for any applicable 
coverage, and to insurance for any other coverage for 
which said fees were paid so long as: 
a. this company continues to write such coverages; 
b. the vehicle to be insured meets the eligibility 
requirements of the company; and 
c. the insured remains a risk desirable to the company. 
While this policy is in force, the first insured named in 
the declarations is entitled to vote at all meetings of 
members and to receive dividends the Board of 
Directors in its discretion may declare in accordance 
with reasonable classifications and groupings of 
policyholders established by such Board. 
2. No Contingent liability. This policy is non-assessable. 
3. Annual Meeting. The annual meeting of the members 
of the company shall be held at its home office at 
Bloomington, Illinois, on the second Monday of June 
at the hour of 10:00 A.M., unless the Board of Directors 
shall elect to change the time and place of such meeting, 
in which case, but not otherwise, due notice shall be 
mailed each member at the address disclosed in this 
policy at least 10 days prior thereto. 
In Witness Whereof, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company has caused this policy to be signed by its 
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5 Reporting a Claim - Insured's Duties - What to do if you have an acadent, claim or are sued. 
3 Defined Words 
4 Declarations Continued 
4 When and Where Your Coverage Applies 
4 Financed Vehicles - Coverage for Creditor 
Coverages 
6 A - Liability - When there is damage to others 
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6885EE * MENDMENT OF UNINSURED MO" 
.ND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEH. 
R VEHICLE - COVERAGE U 
JLE - COVERAGE W 
This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy remain the 
same and apply to this endorsement. It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a different effective date 
is shown for the endorsement on the Declarations Page. 
Issued by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY of Bloomington, Illinois, 
or the STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY of Bloomington, Illinois, as shown by the company's 
name on the policy of which this endorsement is a part. 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that SECTION III - UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
- COVERAGE U AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W of your policy is changed 
as follows: 
1. Item 2 under When Coverage U Does Not Apply 
is changed to read: 
2. FOR BODILY INJURY TO ANY IN-
SURED WHILE OCCUPYING A MO-
TOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, 
YOUR SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE 
IF IT IS NOT INSURED FOR THIS 
COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY. 
2. Item 2 under When Coverage W Does Not Apply 
is changed to read: 
FOR BODILY INJURY TO ANY IN-
SURED WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR 
VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR 
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS 
NOT INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE 
UNDER THIS POLICY. 
3. The provision titled If There Is Other Uninsured 
Motor Vehicle Coverage is changed to read: 
If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle 
Coverage 
1. If the insured sustains bodily injury as a 
pedestrian, or while occupying your car 
and your car is described on the declara-
tions page of another policy providing un-
insured motor vehicle coverage: 
a. the total limits of liability under all 
such coverages shall not exceed that of 
the coverage with the highest limit of 
liability; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our 
share is that per cent of the damages 
that the limit of liability of this cover-
age bears to the total of all such unin-
sured motor vehicle coverage 
applicable to the accident. 
2. If the insured sustains bodily injury while 
occupying a vehicle not owned by you, 
your spouse or any relative, this coverage 
applies: 
a. as excess to any uninsured motor vehi-
cle coverage which applies to the vehi-
cle as primary coverage, but 
b. only in the amount by which it exceeds 
the primary coverage. 
If coverage under more than one policy 
applies as excess: 
a. the total limit of liability shall not ex-
ceed the difference between the limit of 
liability of the coverage that applies as 
primary and the highest limit of liabil-
ity of any one of the coverages that 
apply as excess; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our 
share is that per cent of the damages 
that the limit of liability of this cover-
age bears to the total of all uninsured 
motor vehicle coverage applicable as 
excess to the accident. 
3. THISC ,£RAGE DOES NOT APPLY 
IF THERE IS OTHER UNINSURED 
MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE ON A 
NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. 
4. The provision titled If There Is Other Underin-
sured Motor Vehicle Coverage is changed to 
read: 
1. Regardless of the number of motor vehicles 
involved, the number of persons covered or 
claims made, vehicles or premiums shown 
in the policy or premiums paid, the limit of 
liability for underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage may not be added to or stacked 
upon limits for such coverage applying to 
other motor vehicles to determine the 
amount of coverage available to an insured 
injured in any one accident. 
2. II ^ insured sustains bodily injury as a 
pedestrian or while occupying a vehicle not 
owned by the insured or a relative and other 
underinsured motorist coverage applies: 
a. the insured must elect one policy under 
which to make a claim; and 
b. COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY 
DOES NOT APPLY IF RECOVERY 
IS AVAILABLE UNDER THE UN-
DERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE OF THE ELECTED 
POLICY. 
3. THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF 
THERE IS OTHER UNDERINSURED 
MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE ON A 
NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. 
President 
2 6885EE.1 
o082P AMENDATORY ENDORSED <T 
This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy remain 
the same and apply to this endorsement It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a different 
effective date is shown for the endorsement on the Declarations Page. 
Issued by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY of Bloomington, 
Illinois, or the STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY of Bloomington, Illinois, as shown 
by the company's name on the policy of which this endorsement is a part. 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed your policy is changed as follows: 
1. The definition of non-owned car under 
DEFINED WORDS is changed to read: 
Non-Owned Car - means a car not owned, 
registered or leased by: 
1. you, your spouse; 
2. any relative unless at the time of die 
accident'or tow: 
a. the car currently is or has within the 
last 30 days been insured for (lability 
coverage; and 
b. the driver is an insured who does not 
own or lease the car; 
3. any other person residing in the same 
household as you, your spouse or any 
relative; or 
4. an employer of you, your spouse or any 
relative. 
Non-owned car does not include a: 
1. rented car while it is used in connection 
with the insured's employment or busi-
ness; or 
2. car which has been operated or rented by 
or in the possession of an insured during 
any part of each of the last 21 or more 
consecutive days. If the insured is an 
insured under one or more other car poli-
cies issued by us, the 21 day limit is 
increased by an additional 21 days for 
each such additional policy. 
A non-owned car must be a car in the lawful 
possession of the person operating it 
2. REPORTING A CLAIM - INSURED'S 
DUTIES 
a. The following provision is added to item 4: 
The person making claim also shall answer 
questions under oath when asked by anyone 
we name, as often as we reasonably ask, and 
sign copies of the answers. 
b. Item 4b is changed to read: 
The person making claim also shall: 
b. be examined by physicians chosen 
and paid by us as often as we reason-
ably may require. A copy of the 
report will be sent to the person upon 
written request. The person, or his or 
her legal representative if the person 
is dead or unable to act, shall author-
ize us to obtain all medical reports 
and records. 
3. SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
COVERAGES 
a- The provision titled Limit of Liability -
Comprehensive and Collision Coverages is 
changed to rea± 
6082P 
b. 
Th it of our liability for loss to prop-
er^ ^i any part of it is the lower of: 
1. the actual cash value; or 
2. the cost of repair or replacement 
Actual cash value is determined by the 
market value, age and condition at the 
time the loss occurred Any deductible 
amount that applies is then subtracted. 
The cost of repair or replacement is based 
upon one of the following: 
1. the cost of repair or replacement 
agreed upon by you and us; 
2. a competitive bid approved by us; 
or 
3. an estimate written based upon 
the prevailing competitive price. 
The prevailing competitive price 
means prices charged by a 
majority of the repair market in 
the area where the car is to be 
repaired as determined by a sur-
vey made by us. If you ask, we 
will identify some facilities that 
will perform the repairs at the 
prevailing competitive price. 
We will include in the estimate 
parts sufficient to restore the 
vehicle to its pre-loss condition. 
You agree with us that such parts 
may include either parts fur-
nished by the vehicle's manufac-
turer or parts from other sources 
including non-original equip-
ment manufacturers. 
Any deductible amount that applies is 
then subtracted 
The first paragraph under Settlement of Loss 
- Comprehensive and Collision Coverages 
is changed to read: 
/e have the right to settle a loss with you 
or the owner of the property in one of the 
following ways: 
1. pay the agreed upon actual cash 
value of the property at the time 
of the loss in exchange for the 
damaged property. If the owner 
and we cannot agree on the actual 
cash value, either party may 
demand an appraisal as described 
below. If the owner keeps the 
damaged property, we will 
deduct its value after the loss 
from our payment The damaged 
property cannot be abandoned to 
us; 
2. pay to: 
a. repair the damaged property 
or part, or 
b. replace the property or part. 
If the repair or replacement 
results in betterment, you must 
pay for the amount of betterment; 
or 
3. return the stolen property and pay 
for any damage due to the theft 
Appraisal under item 1 above 
shall be conducted according to 
the following procedure. Each 
party shall select an appraiser. 
These two shall select a third ap-
praiser. The written decision of 
any two appraisers shall be bind-
ing. The cost of the appraiser 
shall be paid by the party who 
hired him or her. The cost of the 
third appraiser and other appraisal 
expenses shall be shared equally 
by both parties. We do not waive 
any of our rights by agreeing to an 
2 6082P 
appraisal. We have tl jht to 
move the damaged property, at 
our expense, to reduce storage 
costs during the appraisal proc-
ess. 
The Settlement of Loss provision for 
comprehensive and collision coverages 
incorporates the Limit of Liability provi-
sion of those coverages. 
c. Trailer Coverage 
Items b and c under "A non-owned trailer or 
detachable living quarters unit is one that:** 
are changed to read: 
c. 
has not been used * ited by or in 
the possession of you, your spouse or 
any relative during any part of each 
of the last 21 or more consecutive 
days. If you are insured by one or 
more other car policies issued by us, 
the 21 day limit is increased by an 
additional 21 days for each such 
additional policy; and 
is not rented and used in connection 
with the employment or business of 




>R AMENDMENT OF DEFINED WOT 
NO-FAULT — COVERAGE P 
SAND 
This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy remain the 
same and apply to this endorsement. It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a different effective date 
is shown for the endorsement on the Declarations Page. 
This endorsement is issued by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY of 
Bloomington, Illinois, or the STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY of Bioomington, Illinois, as 
shown by the company's name on the policy of which this endorsement is a pan. 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that your policy is changed as follows: 
1. DEFINED WORDS 
The definition of newly acquired car is changed to 
read: 
Newly Acquired Car - means a replacement 
car or an additional car. 
Replacement Car- means a car purchased 
by or leased to you or your spouse to replace 
your car. This policy will only provide 
coverage for the replacement car it you or 
your spouse: 
1. tell us about it within 30 days after 
its delivery to you or your spouse; 
and 
2. pay us any added amomr due. 
Additional Car - means an addec car pur-
chased by or leased to you or your spouse. 
This policy will only provide coverage for 
the additional car if: 
1. it is a private passenger car and we 
insure all other private passenger 
cars; or 
2. it is other than a.private passenger 
car and we insure all cars 
owned by you or your spouse on the date of 
its delivery to you or your spouse. 
This policy provides coverage for the ad-
ditional car only until the earlier of: 
1. 12:01 a.m. on the 31st day after the 
delivery of the car to you or your 
spouse; or 
2. the effective date and time of a 
policy issued by us or any other 
company that describes the car on 
its declarations page. 
You or your spouse may apply for a policy 
that will provide coverage beyond the 30th 
day for the additional car. Such policy will 
be issued only if both you and the vehicle 
are eligible for coverage at the time of 
application. 
2. SECTION II - NO-FAULT - COVERAGE P 
When Coverage P Does Not Apply 
1. Item 1 is deleted. 
2. The following provision is added: 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNDER 
THIS POLICY FOR BODILY INJURY 
TO ANY PERSON WHO IS INJURED: 
a. WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR 
VEHICLE WHICH IS: 
(1) OWNED BY OR FURNISHED 
FOR THE REGULAR USE OF 
YOU OR ANY RELATIVE; AND 
(2) NOT INSURED FOR NO-
FAULT COVERAGE UNDER 
THIS POLICY. 
b. WHEN STRUCK BY A MOTOR 
VEHICLE WHICH IS: 
(1) OWNED BY THE INJURED 
PERSON; AND 
(2) NOT INSURED FOR NO-
FAULT COVERAGE UNDER 
THIS POLICY. 
cSShjao^^u\V9 t 
President 
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